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Abstract   
Access to water is critical for survival and well-being. Current debates on water in South 
Africa are dominated by the human rights and neo-liberal approaches. The human rights 
approach advocates for water to be treated as a public good to ensure that everyone has access 
to it because without water, there is no life. On the other hand, in the neo-liberal approach 
water is regarded as an economic good to reflect its true cost and is managed through market-
based mechanisms that encourage its efficient use. The City of Cape Town installed water 
management devices in Saxonsea, Atlantis as a solution to water scarcity in poor households 
and to aid cost recovery measures. The water management devices, initiated within the neo-
liberal paradigm, have been marketed as convenient tools that ‘assist’ users to manage their 
daily water consumption and thus reduce their debt. Using a human rights framework this 
study examined the impact of the City’s water management strategies, specifically the water 
management devices, on selected households in Saxonsea. The impact of cost recovery 
policies on poor households was interrogated in the light of government’s distributional and 
procedural equity in service delivery. The main issues arising from the study were lack of 
consultation, inadequate information, and perception of powerlessness. The study concludes 
that although water management devices have contributed to significant improvements in 
water saving, poor households are burdened with the responsibility of saving water. If the 
idea is to save water across the board, this regimen should be extended to all water users and 
not targeted at poor households only. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Water is important for life. Without water, life is impossible. Water scarcity issues have 
characterized South Africa’s waterscape and therefore received attention in a bid to redress 
historical imbalances and at the same time, ensure its availability to all sectors of the economy 
(for domestic, industrial and other economic sectors). When the newly elected African 
National Congress (ANC)-led government came into power, it was widely expected that the 
lives of the majority of previously disadvantaged people would be improved and implicit in 
this was the provision of adequate housing, health and water services, among others. Dugard 
(2008:74) observes that expectations were high that water would receive high priority in the 
equalisation of basic services. In addition, the ‘progressive legislative framework’ for water 
services, including the Free Basic Water (FBW) policy, was designed to ensure that every 
household received a lifeline amount of water for basic needs. This was an acknowledgement 
of the need to right the wrongs of the past. These steps were not only in line with the 
Constitutional guarantees of the right of access to sufficient water, but also with the ruling 
ANC’s political mandate to improve the lives of the majority of people and in the process 
restore their dignity. However, the need to extend water services to the majority of people 
conflicted with the principles of cost recovery (Earl, et al 2005). Therein lies the conflict 
between the human rights and the neo-liberal framework. 
 
Dugard (2008) argues that the difference between framework and reality lies in the 
ascendance of the neo-liberal drive towards cost recovery, with national government 
delegating the responsibility for water services to under-funded municipalities. Without 
financial and technical support from national government, municipalities had to maximize 
profits and recover service-related costs, including water provision, from all areas, including 
poor communities. In this light, water becomes a commodity rather than a public good; hence, 
the preoccupation with cost recovery from poor communities. Lack of national regulation to 
enforce basic water standards gives municipalities the leeway to commodify water in order to 
be financially viable. This situation creates a tension between the right of access to water as 
guaranteed by the Constitution and the neo-liberal approach rooted in cost recovery. 
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It is in this light that the installation of water management devices (hereafter WMDs) in poor 
areas across the City of Cape Town (hereafter the City) has become one of the most 
controversial issues since the Democratic Alliance assumed power in 2006, with critics and 
civic organisations calling the devices ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (Rudin 2008:19). In 
2008, the City installed WMDs in Saxonsea at Atlantis as a cost recovery measure to ensure 
that households used water that they could afford. Saxonsea is a suburb with 2 500 formal 
metered housing units.  
 
1.2 Background to the study 
The dawn of South Africa’s democratically elected government brought about reforms aimed 
at redressing apartheid’s skewed water policies, among others. Key to the reforms was the 
sustainable management of water resources, and the result was two important pieces of 
legislation: the Water Services Act (No. 108 of 1997) (WSA) and the National Water Act 
(No. 36 of 1998), based on principles of participation and social justice. These Acts contain 
provisions that require the involvement of citizens in the management of water resources. 
Because of its multi-faceted roles and different levels of community involvement the concept 
of participation is related to rights of citizenship and democratic governance.  According to 
Schreiner, et al (2002:55), both the WSA and NWA were expected to ‘redress the inequalities 
of racial and gender discrimination of the past; link water management to economic 
development and poverty eradication; and ensure the preservation of the ecological resource 
base for future generations’. 
 
The study site, Atlantis, is approximately 57km out of Cape Town and its distant location is 
arguably best suited for pilot projects such as the installation of WMDs. There is a noticeable 
pattern of pilot projects targeted at poor households in outlying settlements in Cape Town. In 
2001, the ANC-led City Council carried out a pilot project for pre-paid water meters in Kilo 
litreipheuwel, north of Durbanville, but this was abandoned in 2005 because of its perceived 
negative social effects (Kumwenda 2006). Similar to the WMDs, it was envisaged that the 
pre-paid meters would remedy the poor’s water management problems and aid the 
implementation of the FBW policy, and therefore reduce wastage and improve cost recovery 
for the City. The only difference between the pre-paid water meters and the WMDs was that 
with the former, water was available without regulation; when the free water was exhausted, 
consumers had to pay to access additional water. On the other hand, WMDs are water meters 
that have been pre-set to dispense a specific amount of water per day, self-shut when that 
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amount is exhausted and restart the following morning. In this way households can access 
water throughout the month, notwithstanding whether this amount is adequate or not for 
individual household consumption. 
The City installed and promoted WMDs as water saving devices that would ensure that poor 
households reduced their consumption to affordable levels. The replacement of conventional 
credit water meters with WMDs could be interpreted to symbolise a shift in the relationship 
between the City as service provider and the households and residents of Cape Town as water 
users. Critics have argued that the WMDs are in violation of the right to water enshrined in 
the Constitution. Section 27(1) (b) of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) guarantees the right 
of: 
 
Every person in the country to have access to sufficient food and water … the state 
must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
 
This right to water has been operationalised through the WSA, whose objectives include the 
provision of access to basic water and sanitation. The Act compels all water service 
institutions to take reasonable measures to realise this right.  
 
While the Constitution upholds the rights of individuals to access sufficient water and food, it 
remains vague on the meaning of ‘sufficient’ water which individuals are entitled to access 
for their needs and gives the state an upper hand in determining the reasonable legislative and 
other measures. Hence municipalities such as the City introduced WMDs to deal with this 
notion of sufficient water. In the process, the ‘lifeline’ water gazetted for every household to 
use free of charge, became the subject of regulation through the WMDs.  Gabru (2005) 
observes that access to sufficient food and water are components of an adequate standard of 
living necessary for a dignified life. Similarly, Steyn and Nikilo litreaas (2002) argue that 
while the right to access water as embodied in the Constitution is a socio-economic right, the 
major issue is how these rights can be effectively exercised and enforced.  
 
This study examined the impact of WMDs in 230 Saxonsea households and how they have 
adjusted to a daily limit of 350 litres, (the equivalent of two full bathtubs), from a situation 
where their water was unlimited through the conventional water meter system. The WMDs 
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automatically switch off once the daily limit has been exhausted and dispense water the 
following morning.  
 
The free basic water lifeline of 6kilo litre of potable water and 4,2kilo litre for sanitation was 
calculated to provide 350 litres per household of eight people. According to the City, 
regulated access to free basic water would ensure that residents had water on a daily basis but 
would not use more than they could afford to pay for. The WMDs were expected to ‘assist’ 
households to manage their water consumption (City of Cape Town 2007). As part of the 
Integrated Water Repair Project (IWRP), the City implemented a water-leaks repair project 
whose objective was to repair domestic leaks for residents free of charge to prevent water 
loss.  
 
Participating households’ debt would be written off after a period of six months depending on 
their water use. Residents whose property value was less than R200 000.00 or whose monthly 
income was below R3 000.00 qualified for the Indigent Grant.
1
 Non-participating households 
were expected to settle their bills or face the consequences of debt collection by the City 
authorities (City of Cape Town 2007; Cape Argus 2011).  
 
1.3 The research problem  
This study sought to investigate whether water management devices (WMDs) affected poor 
households or were just a tool used to control their access to water. It also investigated 
whether this technological intervention was the solution to water problems; how it fitted into 
water scarcity more broadly; and whether it was just about managing water in remote 
locations.  
 The City implemented the free basic water policy and installed WMDs in poor households to 
ensure that they only consume what they can afford and not incur additional expenses. The 
incentive offered for installing the devices was debt write-off. The replacement of 
conventional water meters with WMDs symbolised a shift in the relationship between the 
service provider and the water user. The conventional water meter was based on trust: the user 
was expected to pay for the water used at the end of the month. Conversely, technologies such 
as the WMDs symbolise the mistrust between service providers and users, with regulated 
access that leaves no room for negotiation. Disconnection of water service is an inherent non-
                                                        
1 Indigent grant is a subsidy designed to provide additional 4 500 litres free water to indigent households over 
and above the free 6000 litres that all households receive per month. 
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negotiable feature of the WMDs although the City as describes it as ‘assisting’ households to 
save water. To this end, disconnection is seen as playing a positive role in assisting 
households to not use more water than they can afford. It forces the households to calculate 
and budget their water use carefully. 
The provision of free basic water across the country was aimed at redressing imbalances in 
the majority black population’s access to water services under the apartheid regime. While the 
FBW policy has been applauded as bringing relief to the poor, its implementation by local 
authorities is dependent on their financial ability, with the potential to leave poor households 
vulnerable and insecure. Rudin (2008) argues that the onslaught of water limiting 
technologies throughout the country’s municipalities has resulted in the majority of poor 
households being trapped between the FBW allocation and having inadequate water for their 
basic needs. (Narsiah 2010; Loftus 2006) also argue further that the introduction of these 
technologies in poor areas betrayed the purpose of the FBW policy and is effectively about 
managing water consumption by the poor rather than articulating their constitutional right to 
water. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the study   
The main objectives of the study are: 
 To explore the impact of the WMDs in the affected households and assess how their 
socio-economic situation has changed since the installation of the devices.  
 To examine whether households’ participation in the installation of WMDs was by 
consensus or coercion. 
 To examine to what degree WMDs in their current rollout could be seen as a tool that 
effectively enhances water management without sacrificing democratic objectives of 
improving access to resources by the previously disadvantaged poor. 
 
1.5  Research questions  
Following from the above objectives, the following research questions guided the study: 
1. What is the impact of WMDs on participating households and do they understand how  
WMDs operate? 
2. What form of consultation was conducted with residents by the City, and what 
concerns did residents raise? 
3. How did households participate in the installation of WMDs?  
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4. Were residents informed by City officials about water scarcity and their role in its 
conservation? 
5. What is the impact of WMDs on South Africa’s water resources management? 
 
 
1.6  Study’s contribution to the body of knowledge 
There is evidence that mainstream economic, legal and governance tools to manage water 
aggravate poverty by further reducing poor people’s beneficial use of water, especially in 
water scarce areas. For example, Schreiner & van Koppen (2001) indicate that often policies 
developed in the West and North are not universally applicable to situations with growing 
competition for water uses. Their argument is that “water management is not an end to itself 
but a means to eradicate poverty and guarantee basic rights” (Schreiner & van Koppen 
2001:45). In addition, linkages exist between poverty and water, with the women in rural 
areas experiencing the drudgery of fetching water, while in urban areas, the high price of 
water from water vendors places women (commonly responsible for collecting water for their 
families) in a challenging position given the low income level.  
 
 Access to adequate water is critical for household survival and well-being. The study sought 
to contribute to the on-going debate on access to water as a human right, and to highlight the 
role and impact of technology as cost recovery tool. Technology puts a layer between the 
water supplier and the consumer, a situation that has the potential to alienate the two parties 
because of the removal of the human interface. The fact that the City ‘consulted’ households 
at the implementation stage of the project gives the impression that it decides what is good for 
the households, creating a potentially unequal and contentious relationship between the two 
parties. At the state level, the City benefits from this by having more control over the use of 
the water resource through the technological intervention.  
 
1.7  Conceptual issues 
Conceptually the study draws from both the human rights and neo-liberal approaches using 
the public participation and cost recovery lenses to assist in understanding attitudes and 
perceptions towards water service provision and to assess whether selective application is the 
answer to water scarcity and conservation. 
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As mentioned earlier, neo-liberal and human rights approaches dominate current debates on 
water in South Africa. The neo-liberal approach views water as an economic good that should 
be priced to reflect its true cost and managed through market-based mechanisms that 
encourage its efficient use. The human rights approach, on the other hand, advocates for water 
to be treated as a public good to ensure that everyone has access to it.  
 
1.7.1 Arguments for the human rights approach to water 
The human rights and neoliberal approaches to water are discussed in more detail in Chapter 
2. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution of South Africa (discussed in Chapter 2) is 
considered as the cornerstone of democracy. To a large extent this study draws from the 
concept of human rights as espoused by the relevant instruments and bodies of the 
international community. An example is the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action,
2
 which regard severe deprivation as an infringement of human rights.  
 
Other international statements, including the Dublin Principle (1992), recognise the ‘right to 
adequate clean water and sanitation service that can be accessed by all citizens within 
reasonable distance of their living quarters’ (SAHRC 2005:14). Water should be accessible to 
ensure people’s physical security, and should be of acceptable quality and free from pollution. 
Mehta (2006) observes that experiences in water privatisation have not always been poor-
friendly as water companies are usually monopolies and do not face any competition. Barlow 
(1999) cited in Mehta (2006) argues that water is increasingly emerging as ‘blue gold’ for 
private investors, adding that its commodification could erode people’s informal rights to free 
water. In addition Nilsson (2005) argues that the notion of water as social good is associated 
with the human rights perspective and with a free, heavily subsidised supply of water. Lastly, 
the affordability of water should not prevent people from accessing safe drinking water; 
neither should it compromise access to basic services such as food, health and education. 
 
1.7.2 Arguments for the neoliberal approach to water  
Critics have described neo-liberalism as an exclusionary regime. In South Africa, the 
arguments for water as an economic good interrogate the legislative instruments put in place 
to redress the historical imbalance of access to water resources by the majority of previously 
                                                        
2 The Vienna Declaration states that ‘the existence of widespread extreme poverty inhibits the full and effective 
enjoyment of human rights; its immediate alleviation and eventual elimination must remain a high priority for all 
international community’ (paragraph 14) 
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disadvantaged people. One of the major issues is how the concept of water as an economic 
good ensures that people have access to it. Von Schnitzler (2008) argues that prepaid water 
meters are the capillary ends of cost recovery and are ‘indicative of a larger transformation of 
the political terrain that rests ambivalently between late apartheid and the fruition of neo-
liberal reforms in the post-apartheid period’. 
 
The fourth principle of the Dublin Statement
3
 on Water and Sustainable Development of 1992 
states that water has ‘an economic value in all it’s competing uses and should be recognized 
as an economic good’. Grafton (2010) argues that higher water charges would encourage 
conservation of water, improve efficiency and encourage investment in improving existing 
supplies. In this regard, ‘integrated water resources management calls for the trilogy of 
economic efficiency, equity, and environmental sustainability to be applied to the water 
sector’ (Grafton 2010:126). Water prices should reflect the value of the commodity and the 
full cost of supply to mitigate its scarcity. However, Bond (2000) argues that the World Bank 
develops policies and projects that further the commodification of water, which entail 
highlighting its role mainly as an economic good, attempting to reduce cross-subsidisation 
that distorts tariffs, promoting a limited form of means-tested subsidisation, establishing 
shadow prices for water as an environmental good, solving problems associated with state 
control of water and in the process, fostering the conditions for water privatisation. Bond 
further criticises the World Bank for sneaking in cost recovery conditions as part of its loans 
to developing countries. 
 
1.7.3 Governance and public participation  
This study used governance and public participation as a lens to explore the extent of 
residents’ participation in the implementation and installation of the WMDs. Residents’ 
‘participation’ comes in the form of accepting the installation of WMDs because of the 
embedded financial incentives. The nature of communication between the City and residents 
is important insofar as it reflects the relationship between the two parties and determines how 
programmes or projects are put across. The debt cancellation promise for ‘participating’ 
households comes across as coercive compliance for the implementation of the WMDs 
because non-compliance entails unspecified action by the service provider. In addition, an 
offer to repair leaks before the installation of WMDs could be interpreted as softening the 
                                                        
3 The Dublin Conference of 1992 resulted in a set of four principles that highlighted and supported the 
commodification of water. 
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blow and appearing to be benevolent to the plight of the affected households. The FBW 
policy, as mentioned earlier, seeks to redress the historical imbalance of access to water but 
its implementation through technological interventions such as WMDs and prepaid water 
meters further entrenches the inequality to this scarce resource. This is discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
 
1.8 Methods and data collection 
The aim of this mixed methodology study was to explore the impact of WMDs on 
households, the response by the City to the results of the implementation of these devices, and 
to assess whether this intervention was the best solution for the City and the affected 
households. 
 
The advantage of using a mixed methodology is that the convergence of evidence from 
various sources gives a high degree of credibility, and helps with triangulation of information 
(Bromley 1986). For this reason information was collected from three levels: from selected 
households the service users), City
4
 officials (the service provider) and the Ward Councillor 
(the policy implementer). 
 
Questionnaires were administered to 230 households and in-depth interviews were done with 
10 households. Neuman (1994) says immersion gives the researcher an opportunity to get an 
intimate familiarity with people’s lives and culture. This enabled the researcher to observe the 
daily activities within the households and how the family members related to each other 
within the context of their environment, catching nuances that would have been difficult to 
detect using other research approaches. 
 
A quantitative survey and in-depth face-to-face interviews were conducted. In this study the 
in-depth interviews were used to triangulate the findings of the questionnaire survey and 
therefore get a robust answer. The interviews provided additional information, especially for 
the reasons behind households’ acceptance of WMDs. 
 
                                                        
4 Policy documents from the City of Cape Town were reviewed in order to get clarity on the direction regarding 
water management strategy. 
 
 
 
 
  10 
1.8.1 Survey of policy documents 
Surveying policy documents provided clarity on other methods used in data collection. They 
gave clarity on the strategies used by the City and showed a clear shift to neoliberal cost-
recovery strategies at both local and national levels. Collection of primary field data was 
complemented by the use of secondary materials in the form of reviews of relevant 
documentation, such legislation, official municipal documents regarding the intervention and 
other literature related to my research problem. The review of documents is an unobtrusive 
method of gathering secondary data and is useful for triangulation. Marshall and Rossman 
(2006) observe that the use of documents often entails content analysis, which can be 
conducted without disturbing the setting, and allows the researcher to determine where the 
emphasis lies after gathering data. 
 
The success of the research is dependent on the integrity of the researcher and Neuman (1994) 
observes that in all research, opportunities for a distrustful and dishonest researcher exist but 
some degree of trust should be placed on the researcher. The researcher is aware that the 
human factor presents the problem of bias because the presence of the researcher affects the 
way both the researched and the researcher present themselves. Neuman (1994) says in this 
way the researcher takes advantage of personal insight, feelings and perspective as a human 
being to understand the social life under study, and at the same time guard against their own 
values and assumptions during the research process.  
 
1.8.2 In-depth interviews 
The advantage of the in-depth interview is that it is focused and allows the researcher and 
respondent freedom to explore an issue within the framework of guided conversation. During 
the interview process, notes were taken with permission from the interviewees so as to have 
backup copy for later verification. 
 
Face to face, interviews were conducted on three levels: with the City’s project manager; with 
the Ward Councillor for Ward 29; and with the selected households. The purpose of the 
interviews was to identify factors that affected the implementation of the right to water and 
important issues emerged from these interviews. Perceptions of water use varied from the 
City’s and the community’s point of view. Information gathering took place in two phases: 
interviewing the City officials in 2011 and the selected households in 2012.  
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1.8.3 Key informant interviews 
A key informant is an individual selected for their knowledge and whose personal skills 
and/or position enable them to provide authoritative information and insight into what 
happens in their surrounding. The criteria for selection of the key informants in this 
community was determined by the specific role they play in the community as this would 
ensure that they would be able to impart information required. 
 
In order to get the official side of WMDs intervention, face-to-face interviews were carried 
out with the City’s Waters Services Department project manager. Because of the time 
consuming nature of interviews and large volumes of data that could be gathered, the small 
number of key informants interviewed was deemed sufficient for the study. The key 
informants for this research were officials within the City and at the Wesfleur office in 
Atlantis who have decision-making capacity and were able to provide in-depth information 
about the rationale behind the installation of the WMDs and how these affected the City’s 
cost-recovery strategy. Community leaders were interviewed as they have the pulse of the 
community’s reaction to the WMDs and how the relations between the two parties developed 
after the installation of the WMDs.  
 
Marshall (1996) explains that the principle advantages of using key informants relates to the 
quality of data that can be obtained in a short period, compared with the time-consuming and 
expensive in-depth method. However, Marshall (ibid) cautions that while key informants are 
important to the research process, they might only divulge information that is politically 
correct; further, social rules may discourage the researcher from publishing potentially 
sensitive data that could be attributable to a particular informant. Another issue of concern is 
the authenticity of key informants, and the difficulty that is sometimes experienced in 
identifying someone who has the requisite skills rather than being self-serving and 
preoccupied with their social status. 
 
1.9 Data analysis 
In exploring the research questions, four main themes emerged: poverty; survival skills; 
helplessness or desperation; and neighbourliness (compassion).  
The results are presented in two parts. The first is the quantitative analysis using the SPSS 
package to see the results from the questionnaire survey. While the advantage of using this 
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tool is that it allows for the establishment of relationships among variables, its weakness 
comes out when one needs to explore the reasons for those relationships (Punch 2005). 
 
The second part of the results uses the thematic analysis to identify the common themes that 
emerged from the in-depth interviews done with selected households. The qualitative method 
was used to get in-depth answers to the survey questions, which could not be captured by the 
questionnaire. The two methods complement each other and give the research a rounded lens 
through which to view the research problem.  
 
Three marketing analytical frameworks were used to analyse my research results. These are 
the technology adoption model (TAM), to establish the attitudes of water users towards 
WMDs technology; the confirmation/disconfirmation model, to understand the experience of 
water users; and the citizen as user approach, to assess the extent to which rights are 
advocated in policies that address the provision of economic goods.  
 
Inquiries into people’s attitudes towards and perceptions of technologies recognise that users 
views differ from those of the manufacturers, suppliers and policy makers (Jeffrey & Seaton 
2004).  
 
1.9.1 Research site 
Atlantis, located approximately 50km from Cape Town, was an apartheid-era housing project 
designed to stop Coloured people’s migration into Cape Town in the 1970s. The government 
of the day lured industrialists to locate there and provide employment for the community 
through generous subsidies and other incentives. However, this plan failed to take root and a 
national recession in 1984 rendered Atlantis uneconomic for businesses, resulting in some 
businesses either closing down or relocating to Cape Town. Without this economic lifeline, 
most Atlantis residents lost their jobs and were unable to meet their basic needs. 
 
Saxonsea, the study site, is one of the suburbs in Atlantis. It is one of the most marginalised 
areas in Atlantis and is characterised by limited economic activity. Saxonsea is part of Ward 
29,
5
 which comprises Atlantis Town Centre, Mamre, Avondale, Sherwood, Pella Mission 
                                                        
5 The City Council established 23 sub councils, which have as their base a political, community and service 
interface and serve 105 wards of the City. Sub councils are empowered by the Municipal Structures Act to make 
recommendations on any matters affecting their areas. 
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Station; Protea Park;
6
 and Wesfleur. It is further subdivided into five sections: Pirate Town, 
Lapland, Die Gat, Hungry Town, and Old Traffic Section. Although none of the interviewees 
could confirm the origins of the section names, some residents said these could have been 
associated with gangsters that once operated in the area. Lapland largely comprises old RDP 
houses, valued at approximately R50 000 each (City of Cape Town Valuation Roll 2009); 
while Hungry Town, a middle-class section, has property value up to R250 000.  
 
1.9.2 Justification of the study site 
Through a tender process the City carried out a first pilot project for the installation of WMDs 
in Protea Park from February to July 2007. A follow-up process was carried out in Saxonsea 
in 2008. Other low-income areas in Cape Town, such as Crossroads, Mfuleni and Mitchell’s 
Plain, have water management interventions installed on properties, and these were modified 
after the ‘successful’ implementation of the project in Atlantis.   
 
1.9.3 Limitations of the study 
Limited resources and time constraint did not allow for a robust use of other data gathering 
methods, such as focus groups, where more respondents would have been allowed the 
opportunity to participate in a different setting.  
 
Because of language barriers, the researcher interviewed English-speaking households 
although Saxonsea is a predominantly Afrikaans speaking community. A hired research 
assistant provided interpreting services where respondents were not confident to converse in 
English. In addition, English was used for in-depth key informant interviews and it enabled 
the researcher to use direct quotes without the complexity of translation so as to capture subtle 
meanings in the original language of interaction.  
 
Both the human rights and neoliberal approaches to access to water provide for greater 
debate. Although South Africa’s Constitution upholds the right to water, it is the 
implementation of that right which poses major challenges because of external environmental 
influences. However, these limitations do not make the study less credible. The researcher has 
been aware of them and tried to find ways of minimising their impact on the quality and 
outcome of the research project. 
                                                        
6 The first pilot project for WMDs was carried out in Protea Park 
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1.9.4 Ethical considerations 
Human rights issues are highly politicised, requiring that great care be taken in conducting 
this research study. Names of household interviewees have not been divulged, nor have those 
of City officials that took part in the interviews, as agreed before the interviews were done. 
 
Respondents’ consent was obtained through signed, informed consent forms. It was 
communicated to respondents that involvement in the study was voluntary and did not attract 
any remuneration. The respondents were also made aware that they were free to withdraw 
from the interview process at any stage if they felt uncomfortable to continue. It was 
explained that findings of the study would be used for academic purposes only. 
 
The importance of the study to the community was explained and respondents were assured 
of a high degree of confidentiality and anonymity, not only of information but of their 
identities as well.  
 
1.9.5 Structure of the thesis 
Whereas this chapter has introduced the study problem, objectives, questions and 
significance, the rest of the thesis is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter Two discusses the theoretical framework based on current human rights and neo-
liberal debates on water and the international legislation on the right to water, its non-binding 
status and its impact on the realisation of this right. The use of technological interventions as 
part of water management strategies is discussed in greater detail. The main arguments for 
both approaches are discussed and their differences highlighted.  
 
Chapter Three discusses South Africa’s historical perspective on the right to water using the 
Freedom Charter of 1955, which formed the basis of the human rights discourse. The Bill of 
Rights for the new Constitution of South Africa is discussed.  
 
Chapter Four discusses the operationalisation of the right to water in the democratic South 
Africa, specifically the significance of the Constitutional right of every individual to have 
access to water, especially the urban poor. The results of the fieldwork will be discussed and 
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analysed in the context of the broader debates of national and local government 
responsibilities in the provision of adequate water.  
 
 Chapter Five continues with the analysis of the problem statement; objectives of the study; 
rights versus cost recovery and privatization; and participation of residents in decision-
making processes that affect them.  
Chapter Six summarises the main findings of the research. It also revisits the three objectives 
of the study and discusses how they relate to these findings.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Issues  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the major arguments/debates on human rights and neo-liberal 
approaches to water, with the view to understanding the impact of WMDs on selected 
households in Saxonsea, Atlantis. Debates on water as both a public and economic good are 
discussed in order to understand South Africa’s waterscape. Each of these conceptual 
concerns is discussed in turn. 
 
2.2  Arguments for the human rights approach to water  
The argument for water as a human right emphasises water’s importance and the need for it to 
be accessible to all people without any discrimination, including that based on their ability to 
pay. Generally, human rights have come to be used as a measurement for judging how 
governments treat their citizens. In this regard, international moral codes are used to judge 
nations on how they uphold human rights.  
 
Heard (1997) traces the foundation of natural rights to Hobbes, an early philosopher, whose 
trend of thought pointed towards religion. Heard noted that this is where the debate among the 
proponents of the human rights emanated, with some disputing whether religion had a role in 
the determination of rights. Hobbes’s thinking was reinforced by Immanuel Kant in the 17th 
Century, who added that in a state-structured society, humans needed protection from 
violence against each other, and that this protection would be found in a state of nature (Heard 
2007). According to Heard (1997), Kant’s political ideology was derived from his moral 
philosophy in which he argued for the state to be organised through the imposition of, and 
obedience to, universal laws that in turn should respect the equality, freedoms, and autonomy 
of citizens. The American Declaration of Independence, and France’s Declaration of the Right 
of Man and the Citizens (after the 1789 revolution), are two examples demonstrating the 
influence of the idea of natural rights, following on from Hobbesian thinking. 
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However, the conceptualisation of human rights has been criticised as a Western construct 
based on European traditions. Among others, Jeremy Bentham and Edmund Burke (both 18
th
 
Century philosophers, writing around 1790) argue that the origin of notion of natural rights in 
religion cannot be used as a driving force behind the determination of human rights. Instead, 
they argue that rights emanate from the laws of a particular society and cannot be determined 
universally. They further argue that because societies have different political struggles, it is 
not fair to apply universal human rights.  
2.2.1 Human rights to water in South Africa 
While the United General Assembly (1986) gives a broader context of the Right to 
Development (RTD), South Africa’s waterscape has arguably been a contested space that has 
been tightly controlled by the power relations between the state and the people. This is 
manifested through the myriad legislations put in place by the apartheid government that 
resulted in skewed policies, which placed the majority blacks at the lower end of the scale in 
terms of service delivery and other provisions. This line of thinking translated into all spheres 
of life and was very significant in access to water. The colonial lawmakers tried to import 
laws that derived from the well-watered European environment and apply them to Southern 
Africa’s semi-arid and varied conditions. Predictably the laws were designed to benefit the 
landed few that also enjoyed economic power. The majority blacks, dispossessed of their 
land, had no access to water for productive and economic use.  
 
South Africa’s transition into a multi-racial democracy in 1994 presented an opportunity for 
the new government to redress apartheid’s legacy of unequal access to public goods and 
services. In the water sector this was done through the review of the national policy on water 
use and laws. Water policy reform was necessary to correct the imbalances of the apartheid 
era and became the focal point of the transition to democratic rule (Francis 2000). This was to 
ensure that dignity was restored to previously disadvantaged communities and thus improve 
their living standards, because without adequate water people’s livelihoods would be 
compromised. 
 
The new Constitution and the repealing of old legislation were direct acknowledgements that 
there was need for revamping to allow for equitable distribution of resources, including access 
to water by all people irrespective of their political or ideological persuasion. It was not a 
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realization but an acceptance that access to water superceded any political or power relations. 
The fact that access to water was part of the Constitutional reform meant that its 
implementation was not dependent on the benevolence of the state. 
 
South Africa’s new Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), guarantees equal access to rights, 
privileges and benefits while its Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of South African democracy. 
Section 7(1) of the Constitution indicates that the Bill of Rights enshrines the rights of all the 
people of South Africa and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom. It entrenches the fundamental human rights of every South African, and the water 
sector has used it as a tool to push for both accessible and affordable water (Dugard & Drage 
2012). In its preamble, the Constitution proclaims the need to  
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights (Constitution of RSA Act 108 of 1996:1).  
 
Although it is undeniable that the Constitution has played an important role in ensuring 
improved access to water by the majority of previously disadvantaged people, it is the process 
of redressing inequality that is debatable, and specifically how access to water is impacted on 
in poor communities through the installation of water pressure control systems.  
 
Former Mayor of Cape Town Helen Zille applauded the installation of the WMDs in poor 
areas such as Atlantis, as ‘helping’ both the City’s customers to ‘save water and to manage 
their monthly water bills and the City to manage debt’ (City of Cape Town 2007). To show 
support for the programme, Zille had a WMD installed on her own property. While at face 
value it was commendable that she ‘walked the talk,’ in reality her situation was different 
from that of the affected residents because she made a choice to switch to a WMD, whereas 
Saxonsea residents had that decision taken on their behalf by the City because of their 
inability to pay their water bills. Zille’s statement reflected a shift of responsibility to 
consumers to manage and calculate their water consumption. However, the poor are 
characterised as incapable of making sound judgments and therefore decisions have to be 
made on their behalf to enforce a change in their consumption patterns. Kabeer (2005:15) 
argues that political disenfranchisement; social marginalisation, cultural devaluation and 
economic dispossession define the condition of exclusion and marginalisation. 
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The installation of WMDs by the City places responsibility on affected households to manage 
their relations with the water service provider through the mediation of a piece of technology. 
The same fixation with cost recovery is not applied in ‘wealthy’ communities where 
conventional water meters are in place. Loftus (2003) observes that restrictive measures are 
often targeted at the poor because of their inability to pay their water bills. Bond (1996) 
argues that the installation of pre-paid water meters in Johannesburg’s poor informal areas of 
Orange Farm, Alexandra and Soweto presented a challenge to the impoverished communities, 
adding that government’s buy-in of global neo-liberal policies reproduces and amplifies class 
apartheid in its municipalities. He criticises the privatisation and corporatisation of basic 
services including water, as it does not put into context the socio-economic impact of the 
affected communities.  
 
In England and Wales poor households greeted water privatisation with public outcry. Non-
payment of bills resulted in massive disconnections while private water companies posted 
healthy profits (Drakeford 1998). Although the water companies operated under a series of 
terms and conditions that set out to protect the poor, the regulatory framework’s priority was 
to ensure financial viability of the companies first and the interest of the consumers last. The 
public outcry through popular anti-privatisation campaigns led to its reversal not only in 
England and Wales but also throughout Europe (EPSU Report 2012). The argument that 
privatisation led to efficiency has been marred by the high prices for water which led to the 
companies realising high profits at the expense of their customers. 
 
In South Africa, the key aspect that comes to the fore is the power dynamics between the city 
and residents; the residents and WMDs; or water service providers in the case of 
Johannesburg City and residents of Phiri in Soweto. The relationship between state and 
residents is cemented through the voting process while that with the water service providers 
produces a complex relationship and is mediated by the financial status of the resident as a 
consumer. This changes the nature of the relationship and creates distance between the two 
entities, hence a perceived loss of citizen influence. 
 
Although the City provides its residents with 6,000 litres free every month as part of the 
implementation of the FBW policy, it went further and regulated the free water for the poor 
sections of the community as a way to recover costs for high levels of unpaid bills. It is this 
decision to install WMDs that from a human rights perspective appears to infringe on the 
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rights of the affected households. This study seeks to establish in what way this technological 
intervention curtails the dignity and freedoms of households as espoused by the Constitution. 
Mehta (2006) reiterates that struggles over access to water are characterised by conflicts 
between market and rights-based frameworks, compromising the wellbeing of poor people. 
 
Bates (2011) argues that while ‘every human being in every society is entitled to have basic 
freedoms respected and basic needs satisfied’, the existence of those rights obligates the state 
to ensure that it does not violate human rights. The recognition of human rights does not 
guarantee the realisation of the specific right, however, as these have been routinely violated 
within states and at the international level, as Bates cautions.  
 
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) 
adopted General Comment No. 15 on the right to water in 2002. While the Comment is not a 
legally binding document, it states explicitly that ‘the right to water falls within the category 
of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one 
of the most fundamental conditions for survival’ (Hale 2007:144). Although General 
Comment 15 does not explicitly mention that water should be delivered free of charge, it does 
indicate that water is primarily not an economic good. It thus represents a major step in 
defining the human right to water (Nilsson 2005, Hale 2007). Hale (ibid) cautions that 
General Comment 15 should be understood as the articulation of the recognised but not 
internationally enforceable human right to water, which states can therefore choose to ignore.  
 
This problem of unenforceable rights negates the good intentions of the human rights 
instruments and leaves the poor vulnerable to the dictates of the state. The state, on the other 
hand can equally be rendered powerless if it only plays an enabling role to the powerful 
international financial institutions but cannot intervene in what happens to its people for fear 
of upsetting the status quo. 
 
The well-documented Phiri case
7
 against Johannesburg City’s installation of prepaid water 
meters is a demonstration of the significant difference between recognizing the right to water 
and the physical provision of water supplies to individuals to meet their basic needs. 
                                                        
7 Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus 
curiae) CCT 39/09. The application was first launched in 2006, in the now South Gauteng High Court, 
Johannesburg (and heard by Judge Tsoka), 18 months after Operation Gcin’amanzi in Phiri. 
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Johannesburg Water and the municipality launched Operation Gcin’amanzi (an isiZulu term 
meaning ‘save water’) to encourage poor residents to save water through the installation of 
prepaid water meters. It is important to remember that this operation was launched in 
Soweto’s poor areas and its goals were to reduce unaccounted for water, rehabilitate the water 
network and reduce demand for water, as well as improve payment for services. Although 
Judge O’Regan ruled that the installation of prepaid water meters in Phiri was lawful and did 
not conflict with the Constitution, she highlighted three causes of the water problems 
experienced in Soweto: the corroded pipes laid during the apartheid era; the City of 
Johannesburg’s inaccurate tariff system that resulted in more water being used than was 
stipulated; and finally, the culture of non-payment that started as part of the resistance against 
the apartheid system (Case CCT 39/09). 
 
While the Phiri residents lost their case at the Constitutional Court, they had previously won 
at both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. Notably, Judge Tsoka ruled that the 
installation of prepaid water meters was unlawful, citing that the City of Johannesburg’s 
water services by-laws did not provide for their installation. He also added that the prepaid 
water meters gave rise to unreasonable discontinuations in water supply, a characteristic also 
exhibited by the WMDs installed in Saxonsea, Atlantis.  
 
Although the City has repeatedly pointed out the difference between WMDs and prepaid 
water meters, both devices control access to FBW and have been installed mostly in poor and 
low-income areas as cost recovery tools. In both circumstances, residents have to calculate 
and budget their water usage because it automatically disconnects as soon as the daily 
allocation is exhausted.  
 
2.3  Arguments for the neo-liberal approach to water 
Harvey (2005:2) defines neo-liberalism as ‘a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets and free trade’. Similarly, Palley (2004) also acknowledges that neo-
liberalism is based on ‘the economic parameters of capitalist development and free markets.  
 
Neo-liberal thinking is based on three foundations: the economic (where markets determine 
the direction of interface/service provision); social (where markets comprise individual rights, 
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responsibilities and opportunities); and political (where the state defers involvement in service 
provision to the markets, except regarding legislation and policies) (Venter & Marais 2010). 
 
According to this theory, the role of the state is to create a conducive environment for such 
practices, beyond which it should not interfere as it does not have the capacity to ‘second 
guess’ market signals and withstand the influence of powerful interest groups (Harvey 2005). 
Notably, the emphasis is on political economic practices and not on complete political 
ideology. According to Blomgren (1997), neo-liberalism is a ‘political philosophy that gives 
priority to individual freedoms and the right to property’. Although Blomgren’s 
characterisation of neo-liberalism overlaps with that of Harvey, she emphasises its internal 
diversity. Thorsen & Lie (1997:14) build their definition upon Harvey and Blomgren, and see 
neo-liberalism as ‘a loosely demarcated set of beliefs which most prominently and photo-
typically include the conviction that the only legitimate purpose of the state is to safeguard 
individual, especially commercial liberty as well as strong private property rights’.  
 
Thorsen & Lie (1997:15) argue further that because neo-liberalism is silent on the existence 
of democracy or the free exchanges of political ideas, Harvey’s (2005) definitions means that 
neo-liberalism can be implemented under any regime, be it autocratic or a liberal democracy. 
Following this argument, it is clear that the proponents of neo-liberalism view as necessary 
the relocation of power from the political to the economic processes to ensure the practical 
implementation of neo-liberal policies, without interference.  
 
2.3.1 A critique of neo-liberalism 
Critics have described neo-liberalism as an exclusionary regime. In South Africa, the 
arguments for water as an economic good interrogates the legislative instruments put in place 
to redress the historical imbalance of access to water resources by the majority of previously 
disadvantaged people. One of the major issues is how the concept of water as an economic 
good ensures that people have access to it. Von Schnitzler (2008:902) argues that prepaid 
water meters are the capillary ends of cost recovery and are ‘indicative of a larger 
transformation of the political terrain that rests ambivalently between late apartheid and the 
fruition of neo-liberal reforms in the post-apartheid period’. 
 
On the other hand, Dugard (2008) argues that the ascendency of the neo-liberal thrust towards 
cost recovery and the subsequent decentralisation of water services to municipalities has led 
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to fiscal pressure on municipalities to maximise profits from water services and this has 
manifested itself in a fixation to recover costs from all sectors, including poor communities. 
The gradual decrease of financial and technical support for water services by national 
government has contributed to challenges faced by municipalities and, by association, by their 
residents as well. In addition, a lack of standardised basic water services across the board to 
ensure that everyone enjoys water related rights could lead to motivate municipalities to view 
water as a commodity rather than a public good as they seek to keep themselves afloat 
financially.  
 
It is in this context that the City of Johannesburg embarked on the mass installation of prepaid 
water meters in Soweto under Operation Gcin’Amanzi as a way to curb excessive water 
consumption. It is important to understand the context in which the reference to the City of 
Johannesburg’s water management strategy is made, because when the City of Cape Town 
embarked on the mass installation of WMDs in poorer areas of the metropole, the argument 
was that these devices were not similar to the prepaid water meters installed in Johannesburg. 
In fact, WMDs, as the name implies, are a tool that to make it easy for households to manage 
water use throughout the month without the inconvenience of disconnection, whereas prepaid 
meters work on availability of credit for water – no money, no water.  
 
2.3.2 Implications for the poor of water as an economic good  
An economic good has a value attached to it and therefore assumes a certain level of 
importance. The value of water is therefore measured by the maximum amount that the user is 
willing to pay for it (Briscoe 1996). Brown (2009) argues that water subsidies benefit the 
middle classes at the expense of the poor, who are the intended beneficiaries, as some of them 
may not even be connected to the water supply infrastructure. Further, Brown adds that water 
subsidies distort the market and do not encourage its efficient use. Water should therefore be 
priced to reflect its economic cost in line with the guiding principles that view it as an 
economic good. In this context, Brown calls for the abandonment of the state’s monopoly on 
water provision and advocates for private sector participation, together with the privatization 
of water service provision as an alternative.  
 
Among the supporters of water as an economic good, Rogers et al (2002) argue against the 
conventional wisdom that price increases would result in inequality. Instead, they propose 
that increasing the price of water increases its sustainability because it will be put to valuable 
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use. They add that water has for a long time been recognized as an economic good even 
though the ‘sanitary revolution’ of the 19th Century resulted in the call for public ownership of 
companies that had always provided water services. This revolution resulted in heavy 
subsidization of water but did not remove the fact that water has an economic value. They 
acknowledge that although economic water pricing is the easiest way to promote efficiency, 
equity and sustainability in the water sector, politically it would be difficult to implement. 
Roger et al (2002) dismiss the notion that maintaining lower tariffs improves access to water 
by the poor and argue instead that the poor are willing to pay more. In their opinion, low 
water prices encourage excessive consumption and leave the poor with no choice but to buy 
expensive water from water vendors. Lifeline water tariffs as implemented through the FBW 
policy enable the poor to have access to water for basic needs. Seemingly the poor only need 
water for basic needs and nothing else, because they do not have the capacity to pay for more 
water, thereby limiting their life choices. 
 
Similarly, the Dublin Principle (1992) claimed that water has always been treated as an 
economic good in Europe. Water should be accessible to ensure physical security of 
individuals, and should be of acceptable quality and free from pollution. The affordability of 
water should not prevent people from accessing safe drinking water; neither should it 
compromise access to basic services such as food, health, and education.  
 
Nleya (2008) confirms that the adoption of the Dublin principles at the 1992 International 
Conference on Water and the Environment was symbolic of a new water paradigm whose 
shift was markedly market oriented. The four Dublin principles recognize that: 
 
 water is a finite resource that should be managed in an integrated manner;  
 resources development and management should be based on a participatory approach, 
involving all relevant stakeholders;  
 women play a central role in the provision, management and safe guarding of water; 
and  
 water has an economic value and should be recognized as an economic good, taking 
into account affordability and equity criteria (Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002). 
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These principles were set as a guide to nations to tackilo litree their water management 
programmes. 
 
2.3.3 Commodification of water 
A commodity is a product that has economic value attached to it. Van Rooyen & Hall (2007) 
observe that the market in its assumed role as an institution, influences access to water 
through consumerism and individuality. Stated this way, water services have become a 
commodity with an attached economic value that operates according to prevailing rules. 
McDonald & Ruiters (2005a: 28) describe commodification as the ‘transformation of all 
social relations to economic relations, subsumed by the logic of the market’. This would aptly 
describe the process of limiting water consumption by poor households through various 
means, such as the installation of prepaid water meters in the case of Phiri in Soweto, or 
WMDs in Saxonsea, among other interventions carried out in other parts of South Africa and 
elsewhere in the world. 
 
The World Bank, according to Bond (2000), develops policies and projects that promote the 
commodification of water. This entails arguing that water is an economic good; attempting to 
reduce cross-subsidisation that distorts tariffs; promoting a limited form of means-tested 
subsidization; establishing shadow prices for water as an environmental good; solving 
problems associated with state control of water and in the process; and fostering conditions 
for water privatisation. Bond further criticises the World Bank for promoting cost recovery 
conditions as part of its loans to developing countries. 
 
In 1998, the United Nations Panel on Water declared that as a commodity, water be paid for 
instead of being treated as an essential staple that would be available free of cost (Bond 
2000). The endorsement of public-private partnerships (PPPs) by the UN at the World 
Sustainable Summit in Johannesburg in 2002 clarified the UN’s stance on water issues. 
Further, the UN’s adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
which calls for increased foreign investment in privatized African infrastructure, showed its 
preparedness to wield its authority. Given South Africa’s Constitution that sought to enhance 
access to water as a right, it is rather ironic that it (SA) spearheaded this investment vehicle. A 
perfect example of the effects of water commodification was the cholera outbreak in 
Ngwelezane in KwaZulu-Natal, which followed the disconnection in August 2000 of 
thousands of people’s previously free water supply (Bond 2000). Because they could not 
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afford to pay for clean water, they resorted to unclean water, which resulted in the outbreak of 
disease and in deaths.  
 
2.3.4 Free Basic Water policy  
The FBW policy was introduced in 2001 in part as a response to the Constitutional guarantee 
of the right to access services. The coincidence of the introduction of various cost recovery 
mechanisms such as prepaid water meters and WMDs is disturbing. The lifeline of 6,000 
litres was calculated to provide 25 litres per person per day, based on a household size of 
eight people. However, the major challenge was the implementation of the means test to 
determine who qualified for free water. Hence the decision to provide the lifeline to all 
households, irrespective of their ability to pay. In the end, both the rich and the poor receive 
the same amount, the difference being that with the poor, the FBW was all they had access to 
and management strategies were put in place to manage that lifeline. 
 
While the FBW policy represented a significant step in the realization of the right to water, its 
implementation was dependent municipalities’ financial readiness. The cut-off of 
intergovernmental borrowing resulted in some municipalities being unable to implement the 
policy. Loftus (2006:1033) argues that with the implementation of the FBW policy, service 
providers had to review the basis on which water was supplied to consumers. This forced 
local authorities to use hydraulic systems to limit household consumption patterns on either a 
supply zone or a consumer basis. Loftus (2006) traces the bold decision by eThekwini 
Municipality in Durban to implement the FBW policy and observes that 6000 litres was 
allocated to all households regardless of income; the implementation of water limiting 
technologies was targeted at poor households. Rudin (2008:19) argues that, although the 
Constitution does not specify how much water is ‘sufficient’, government’s arbitrary 
calculation of 25 litres per person or 6kilo litre per month was inadequate as it did not take 
into account the needs of the ‘very young, old, sick and those living with HIV’. Instead, he 
argues that 90 litres per person per day would be adequate because South Africa is rich in 
natural resources and can therefore afford to ensure that the poor access water at no cost. 
 
The City highlighted the differences between WMDs and pre-paid metres as being that the 
former ensured a reliable supply of water to consumers free of charge. Prepaid meters also 
dispense free basic water but the difference is that when this supply is exhausted, the 
consumer has to pay before they can access water again. WMDs ‘ensure’ that consumers have 
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access to water daily by dispensing the pre-set 350 litres. It is the consumer’s responsibility to 
calculate how much water to use for their needs on a daily basis. Arguably the two types of 
technologies may differ in the manner in which they operate but they are a constant reminder 
to households that they have limited access to water. Both types of intervention have been 
given a platform to ‘manage’ the end user’s access to water and have been implemented in 
poor or low-income areas.  
 
 
Table 1: Comparison between WMDs and prepaid water meters 
Issue  WMDs Prepaid 
water 
meters 
Free Basic Water yes Yes 
Calibrated to dispense set amount of water per 
day 
yes No 
Ensure daily access to water yes no 
Save unused water for later use within the 
month 
yes no 
Cost recovery yes yes 
Replaces human intervention yes yes 
Pay for additional water above the set daily 
limit 
yes yes 
 
 
The common thread in poor communities is the introduction and implementation of measures 
to control access to water service provision. Loftus (2003) observes that restrictive measures 
are often targeted at the poor because of their inability to pay their water bills. Bond (1996) 
argues that the installation of pre-paid water meters in Johannesburg’s poor informal area of 
Orange Farm presented a challenge to the impoverished communities, adding that 
government’s buy-in of global neo-liberal policies reproduced and amplified class apartheid 
in its municipalities. Bond criticises the privatisation and corporatisation of basic services 
such as water, as it does not put into context the socio-economic impact of the affected 
communities. Similarly, Naidoo (2005:159) observes that the installation of prepaid meters 
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signified the shift of role by the state from that of being provider of basic services to the 
‘teacher of new way of living under the neo-liberalism’, where the individual takes 
responsibility to ensure delivery of services. 
 
Ironically, the City of Cape Town implemented the WMDs at the time that the Phiri residents 
and City of Johannesburg’s case was before the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court’s judgement appeared to have emboldened the City, given its argument that its WMDs 
were different from pre-paid water meters and ensured daily access to water. The City’s 
project then appeared to have the poor’s interests at heart as it ensured that they had access to 
water daily, unlike the prepaid meters, which offered no such assurance. Notwithstanding the 
City’s argument about the viability of the WMDs, several community leaders and civic 
society organisations criticised them as ingenious versions of the prepaid water meters and 
Rudin (2008) derisively called them ‘weapons of mass destruction’.  
 
2.3.5 Privatisation of water in South Africa 
The water privatization debate is contentious in current development discourse. Gutierrez 
(2003) describes privatization as a political phenomenon that creates new roles and rules 
between state, market and civil society. Bond & MacDonald (2004) note that in South Africa, 
Nelspruit was the first city to enter into a 30 year-long water concession with a foreign water 
company, but this was fraught with massive criticisms and problems from its inception. Both 
labour and community groups criticized the deal because of the perceived challenges 
associated with it.  
 
An argument is made in privatising water services that the public sector is often seen as 
inefficient, corrupt and lacking in the financial power needed to invest in water provision 
(World Bank 1994), while, on the other hand, the private sector is perceived as flexible, 
efficient and essential. Petrella (2001) argues that turning water services to private 
corporations ensures that poor people get good service at appropriate prices. However,  Mehta 
(2006) argues that it is flawed to think that the acceptance of water as an economic good 
would solve water problems or generate efficient use and highlights the danger of the poor 
getting a raw deal compared with rich water users. Instead, she suggests water prices should 
be structured progressively, with cross subsidies to charge the rich for more consumption and 
better services. She further observes that experiences on water privatisation have not always 
been poor-friendly as water companies are usually monopolies and do not face any 
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competition. Barlow (1999, in Mehta 2006) argues that water is increasingly emerging as 
‘blue gold’ for private investors, adding that its commodification could erode people’s 
informal rights to free water. In addition, Nilsson (2005) argues that the notion of water as 
social good is associated with the human rights perspective and with a free, heavily subsidised 
supply of water. 
 
Thompson et al (2008) explain that South Africa’s water policies examine how sins of 
omission largely prevent vulnerable groups from having access to the right to water, 
especially where lack of financial resources, poor institutional capacity and very little 
knowledge of rights prevent them from being realised and claimed by citizens. For example, 
the conflict between FBW policies and privatization and cost recovery negates the citizens’ 
basic rights through the implementation of WMDs in Cape Town and prepaid water meters in 
areas like Orange Farm in Johannesburg. The burden of water scarcity should be shared by all 
water consumers and not be the responsibility of the poor, lest it comes across as 
discrimination. Willingness to pay does not diminish the burden of water scarcity. 
 
Narsiah (2008) criticises the establishment of the Water Research Commission (WRC) in 
1971 as strengthening the economic/commercial value attached to water by the then apartheid 
government. The Water Research Commission (2005a) further confirms Narsiah’s criticism 
as it views water as an economic good, thus removing its human rights and basic needs aspect 
and replacing it with economic principles that govern its accessibility. Narsiah (2007) argues 
that the Commission’s response to global and national trends towards neo-liberalisation of 
water services delivery ties in neatly with the 1992 Dublin Convention, which called for the 
recognition of water as an economic good, as mentioned earlier. 
 
2.4  Legislation and neo-liberalism 
The Water Services Act (No. 108 of 1997) and the National Water Act (No. 36 of 1998) 
provide various legal tools that are potentially effective for eradicating water deprivation 
under conditions of growing water scarcity. Section 3(1) of the Water Services Act proclaims 
that ‘everyone has a right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation’ (Water 
Services Act 1997 (Act No. 108 of 1997:12). De Visser et al (2003:34) describe basic water 
supply as the  
“prescribed minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable 
supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water to households, including informal 
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households, to support life and personal hygiene”. 
 
Right from the outset, the Water Services Act (108 of 1997) clarifies the water consumers’ 
duties and emphasises the financial viability of the water service providers. Therefore, while 
the Act recognizes the right of access to basic water supply, it also acknowledges the need for 
financial viability, making it clear that water is a commodity. The only difference with the 
apartheid legislation is that everyone’s right is recognized and taken care of, irrespective of 
political or economic status. De Visser et al (2003) point out that the Water Services Act 
entrenches the concept of cost recovery as well as the involvement of the private sector in the 
provision of water.  
 
 Section 27(1)(b) entrenches that “everyone has the right to have access to sufficient water” 
for basic needs (RSA Constitution 1996). The idea of human rights in South Africa influenced 
the development of the Freedom Charter, which in turn influenced the Bill of Rights 
contained in the Constitution (du Toit & Sguazzin, 2007). The Bill of Rights enshrines the 
rights of all people in South Africa, affirming the democratic values of human dignity, equity 
and freedom. 
 
According to Okonski (2009:10
8
) research has shown that because water is ‘un-owned, un-
traded, and hence under-priced, water delivery systems, aquifers, and watersheds are in 
serious peril’. She observes the failure by governments of poor countries to provide water to 
millions of their thirsty people and cites substantial underinvestment in the development and 
deployment of new technologies for water management.  
 
Mehta (2006) argues that water rights are embedded in wider legal instruments and tenure 
arrangements that can be competing and conflicting, calling into question water’s publicness, 
but at the same time, cautions that poorly defined water rights could lead to conflicts over 
access. She adds that policy shifts towards Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)
9
 
                                                        
8 Okonski, K (2009) Water wars: is water a human right or a commodity? 
Reference page not available, hence created own page numbers. Article ranges from page 1 – 20. 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Water+wars:+is+water+a+human+right+or+a+commodity%3F-a0194721478 
accessed 29 March 2010 
 
9 GEAR – the conservative macro-economic strategy adopted by ANC government following the failure of the 
RDP policy. The implication was that economic development would be led by the private sector, that the state 
should play a smaller role in the economy, that there would be deep cuts in government spending, and that there 
would be privatisation of state assets, among other drastic changes. 
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and other forms of neo-liberal global economics have obscured links between ordinary 
citizens and their representatives, making tracking processes of accountability difficult across 
these multiple scales.  
 
Thompson et al (2008) express concern that although provision is made in the Constitution 
for every individual to have access to water and basic sanitation, there was a huge possibility 
that some citizens would not be aware of their rights and may lack the capacity to mobilise 
around them; or, in some instances, would mobilize in fragmented and unorganized ways 
without enough impact on government policies or behaviour to be of any benefit. Further, 
Thompson et al (2008) argue that the uneasy mix of official socio-economic entitlements to 
water which conflict with broader economic policies result in the sins of omission and 
commission playing themselves out. 
 
2.5  Public participation and governance  
The Constitution, as the cornerstone of democratic processes in South Africa, enables citizens 
take part in democratic processes both at the local and national levels. Oldfield (2008) 
acknowledges that the role of participatory democracy is to build an inclusive citizenship as 
opposed to the once exclusive state of the apartheid era, which was not responsive to the 
needs of the majority. Both the Constitution and the Municipal Systems Act (2000) require 
municipalities to ensure that disadvantaged communities participate in processes of 
identifying the needs of the larger communities (Gray & Maré 2002). 
 
There are numerous legislative ways in which South Africa’s citizenry are invited to 
participate or are consulted to make an input into important matters that happen around their 
environs. Such participation forums in municipalities, for example, include the mayoral 
izimbizos (public meetings), integrated development plans (IDPs), ward committee meetings, 
and the five-year process of electing municipal representatives. The role of izimbizos is to 
strengthen the system of local government in all three spheres of governance. It is an ‘invited 
space’ in which key issues are discussed and updates given on projects taking place in various 
areas. In this regard, public participation, in accordance with the Bill of Rights, allows people 
to exercise their basic human rights and take part in decisions that affect their future. 
Municipalities often have to facilitate the formation of ward committees, led by the ward 
councillor, in accordance with the Municipal Systems Act (2000). The only drawback of such 
a forum is that it does not have any decision-making capacity but only facilitates debate over 
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resources. Sokupa (2009) argues that since the deliberative role of both ward committees and 
izimbizos are restricted, it affects their impact on local municipalities’ decision-making 
processes, and reduces them to public relations functionaries to give a semblance of broader 
community participation.  
 
One of the roles of ward committees is to identify and discuss major issues that affect their 
locale, but this is frustrated by their lack of meaningful integration into the municipal 
decision-making process which reduces them to mere talk shops and political grandstanding 
opportunities. Ideally, ward committees form an avenue through which ward issues are 
channelled through the councillor to the wider council for deliberation and actioning, thus 
ensuring public participation in decision-making processes. 
 
Piper and von Lieres (2008) lament the lack of any meaningful role by ward committees in 
the development planning or budgetary processes at both the municipal and local level. Their 
role is to strengthen the voice of ward councillors at council meetings. The long-term effect is 
a disjuncture between residents and authorities, often manifested through protest action as 
people express frustration and dissatisfaction with poor service delivery. 
 
According to Servaes (2008:171) participation implies a ‘higher level of public involvement 
in communication systems’, as well as sharing of both economic and political power, which 
often diminishes the advantages of those in power. Freire’s (1979) participation model 
favours the human-centred approach that recognises the importance of interpersonal 
communication and how this impacts on the decision-making process. This approach was 
applied to the Saxonsea study to see how the households reached their decision-making 
process. In order to explore this concept of participation, I draw on Arnstein’s (1969) ladder 
of participation, which ties well with Freire’s approach because it brings out to fore the exact 
nature of participation that took place.  
 
Public participation is vital as it makes residents feel that they are part of the decision-making 
process of projects being implemented for their benefit and therefore gives a sense of 
ownership and control. Konisky & Beierle (2001 in Irvine & Stansbury 2004) argue that the 
debate around citizen participation is no longer representative of government versus citizen 
participation but about the best type of citizen participation. If done well, the citizen 
participation process has the potential to transcend barriers to effective policy as the citizens 
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understand the challenges around them and view themselves as part of the solution (Irvine & 
Stansbury 2004). 
 
Thompson (2007) observes that the success of the public participatory process depends on the 
intended results. On the other hand, the weakness of participatory governance is reflected 
when government views participation as a vehicle to gain legitimacy in decision-making 
rather than as vehicle of change.  
 
Figure 1: Ladder of citizen participation  
 
Source: Arnstein, 1969:217 
 
Arnstein (1969) explains levels of citizens’ participation through an eight-rung ladder each 
depicting the extent of citizens’ power in determining the plan and programme. This ladder of 
participation is useful in the analysis of the nature of public participation by Saxonsea 
residents and the extent to which it could be viewed as voluntary or convenient participation. 
 
The lower rungs of manipulation and therapy depict the non-participation level, which 
enables power-holders to ‘educate’ the participants. Participation without any form of power 
sharing would be a frustrating exercise for vulnerable people, who are already powerless. 
Manipulation, the first rung of the ladder, shows the power play between powerful and 
vulnerable people. Notably it was the City (through the Community Service Agents hired by 
the City’s consultants) that set out to educate, persuade and convince residents that the 
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WMDs were advantageous, and in the process making it (the City) appear benevolent and 
caring about its residents. The relationship was top-down approach. 
 
The Constitution requires local government to be democratic and accountable, and encourages 
the involvement of communities and community organizations in matters of local 
government, but Smith & Vawda (2003) hold a different view. They argue that the 
imperatives of commercialization and cost-recovery of core services, at the expense of greater 
public participation, have the side effects of creating passive customers and undermining the 
cultivation of active citizens. In addition, the sequence of developing the entitlements that 
come with these identities influences how individuals engage with the city. 
 
According to Atkinson (1992:43), there is a notion of ‘popular sovereignty’ that indicates that 
governance is not a separate entity from its citizenry, but that the two are intertwined. Implicit 
is the notion that the government is accountable to the community in an on-going manner. 
This form of democratic and good governance instills an impression that the community owns 
governance. This contextual analysis is in line with the shift from the concept of government 
to governance (Kooiman 1993). 
 
Smith & Vawda (2003) add that the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and 
GEAR represented different visions for how to bring about equity and redistribution in a 
deeply divided state and economy. The shift from RDP to GEAR signified a fundamental 
shift in service delivery. Under RDP, redistribution of resources was vital whereas GEAR 
advocated a free market approach, liberalising the economy, reducing the role of the state and 
deregulating labour (Nattrass 1999). Mayher & Makoatsane (2005) and Mehta (2006) agree 
that, although the ANC government developed the RDP in 1994, the shift to GEAR reflected 
the influence of the World Bank. GEAR’s emphasis on liberalism and market forces 
generated a lot of controversy, which had wider implications especially in the water sector, as 
it translated to disconnections for poor households because water became very expensive. 
These disconnections were in contrast with the pronouncements made by both the 
Constitution and the Water Services Act, which sought to redress the imbalances in the 
provision of services to poor people. The right to water and sanitation is, in fact, not just a 
right to subsidized services but a means to ensure that water and sanitation fulfil a collective 
social and environmental function, and that the most disadvantaged groups in society are 
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effectively empowered to have a say in the decision-making process (Allen, Dávila & 
Hoffman 2005).   
 
The collective orientation of republican citizenship in relation to the state is being replaced by 
an individuating relationship where ‘customer service’ is delivered to current or intended 
clients who purchase products. Those who can afford to pay user fees and have the numeracy 
skills to understand their bills, have the communication confidence to interact with call 
centres and the confidence to complain. These are the entitlements of being a customer. Yet 
for those who have historically been excluded from cultivating their rights as citizens, let 
alone their capacity to be responsible customers, the relationship between the state and 
customer is based on a transaction with little exchange value. There is therefore a critical 
difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power 
needed to affect the outcome of the process. What does this shift from the citizen to the 
customer imply for democracy and the state's relationship to the individual and community? If 
we look at service delivery as a microcosm of this changing relationship, the outcomes of this 
shift threaten to undermine meaningful forms of public participation.  
 
Thompson (2007) observes that the success of the public participatory process depends on the 
reason why it is done, adding that the weakness of participatory governance is reflected when 
government views participation as a vehicle to gain legitimacy in decision-making rather than 
as vehicle of change. With reference to Saxonsea, this study analysed the nature of public 
participation and the role played by residents. The participation process was reduced to 
information sessions during the period when WMDs were installed. Given pronouncements 
by the City (2008) that it is owed more than R12 million in unpaid bills by residents of 
Atlantis, it already complicates the nature of power dynamics and creates an uneven playing 
field.  
 
Since 1994, the South African government has actively promoted users’ participation, for 
example during the formulation of the National Water Act (No. 36 of 1998). Although the 
National Water Act challenged prevailing inequities in water use by introducing a powerful 
legal tool with a potential for change, its major challenge was in the implementation of the 
law. According to Atkinson (1992:43) there is a notion of ‘popular sovereignty’, which 
indicates that governance is not a separate entity from its citizenry but that the two are 
intertwined. Implicit in this form of governance is the notion that the government is 
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accountable to the community in an on-going manner. This form of democratic and good 
governance instils an impression that the community owns governance. This contextual 
analysis is in line with the shift from the concept of government to governance (Kooiman 
1993). 
 
The Phiri Judgement of 2008 presented a major victory for the Orange Farm residents who, 
although they lost their bid for the removal of pre-paid water meters as a violation of their 
human rights, nonetheless won an increase in the basic free allocation of water from 25 litres 
to 40 litres per person per day. The right to water and sanitation is, in fact, not just a right to 
subsidized services but a means to ensure that water and sanitation fulfil a collective social 
and environmental function and that the most disadvantaged groups in society are effectively 
empowered to have a say in the decision-making process (Allen, et al 2005).  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed in detail the broader debates on water services provision and the 
various international instruments that acknowledge the importance of water in the sustenance 
of human beings. These instruments, however, fall short of proclaiming access to water as an 
express human right that stands on its own without being embedded in other rights. The major 
challenge is that states are not obliged to enforce access to water as a human right, but are 
expected to respect it. It is still debatable why this cannot be enforced as a stand-alone right. It 
would seem that the same UN that has a plethora of agreements on human rights also supports 
the commodification of water. It is not coincidental therefore that although the UN in other 
forums recognizes the importance of water, it is unable to force governments to enforce the 
human rights laws. States’ responsibility is to respect the human rights of their citizens but 
they are not obliged to enforce them. 
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Chapter 3: Water policy reform and implications for the poor 
3.1  Introduction 
Chapter 3 looks at the legislative framework on water, using both the neo-liberal and human 
rights lens. It draws out the implications of Constitutional provisions in relation to the 
provision of water, especially for the poor. The review of the current legislation and a 
historical background the previous water policies will put in perspective the current water 
policies, which shape access to water. Specific reference is made to WMDs installed on 
properties in Saxonsea in Atlantis. It is important to remember that while South Africa’s 
Constitution plays a pivotal role in correcting the imbalances of the previous apartheid 
regime, it is largely influenced by the international instruments, many of which lean towards 
neo-liberal persuasions. The advice by the World Bank and other Brenton Woods institutions 
hugely affect the way the South African state sets out to redistribute water, especially to the 
poor. 
 
The chapter is divided into several sections as follows: an overview of apartheid and post-
apartheid water legislation; an introduction of the Constitution as guiding legislation that 
recognized the rights of all citizens to have access to water; a review of current water 
legislation and its impact on the delivery of water services to the poor; the rights and neo-
liberal approaches to water and how these influence current legislation; and FBW policy as a 
cost recovery strategy and how this has been used as a tool to monitor water consumption by 
the poor and whether its implementation is in the spirit of the constitutional provisions of 
access to water. The conclusion summarizes reforms in the water sector and their impact on 
access to water by the poor. 
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3.2  Overview of apartheid and post-apartheid water legislation  
3.2.1 Dutch settlement in Cape Town 
Wuriga (2008) traces governance of water use management to the permanent settlement of the 
Dutch in Cape Town in 1655 and the subsequent introduction of Roman Dutch Law by Jan 
van Riebeek. Laws gave the state responsibility over the ownership and control of water use, 
and in this instance, it favoured the colonial masters who had taken over ownership of land 
and turned the indigenous people into their slaves. The defeat of the Dutch by the British in 
1795 saw a change in the governing system, with the introduction of the English legal system 
bolstered by the riparian principles influenced by the Crown. Under this system, the concept 
of the state control of water use was alien: the Crown had no such control except where it 
concerned naval exploits. The riparian system benefited the landed few (the whites) and the 
common factor between the two systems was marginalization of the dispossessed black 
majority (Warigu 2008). This led to private rights to water access gaining precedence over 
public rights. However, the concept of state control of water was reintroduced following a 
series of amendments to the Water Act (No. 54 of 1956), hereafter the Water Act 1956 
(Rowlston et al 2006; DWAF 1986), aimed at  ensuring the equitable distribution of water 
supply to other industrial and other activities, as well as concern for environmental 
conservation. Notably, equitable distribution applied only to white farmers and individuals 
with private use rights and not to marginalized blacks, most of whom found themselves under 
the jurisdiction of homelands
10
, which, apart from Bophuthatswana, relied on the water laws 
from central government irrespective of their suitability to their environment. 
 
3.2.2 Water reforms 
The water reforms of 1912, 1956 and 1998 were influenced by political changes such as union 
in 1910, the National Party’s election victory in 1948 and the African National Congress’s 
election victory in 1994. Changing developmental needs in the 1950s linked to 
industrialization and urbanization, and the socio-equity factors of the 1990s, influenced the 
provision of water services to poor and disadvantaged communities (Backeberg 1994; Bate & 
Tren 2002). The repeal of the Water Act 1956 and other water legislation implemented during 
                                                        
10 Those that attained ‘independence’ from South Africa included Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei. 
Homelands were not recognized outside South Africa.   
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the apartheid era was meant to make water more accessible to domestic, industrial and 
agricultural users without the restrictions that underlay riparian
11
 principles.  
 
The Water Act of 1956 was promulgated after the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act 
(No. 8 of 1912) became inadequate to cater for the country’s social and industrial growth. The 
Water Act of 1956 resulted in control measures being put in place for industrial water use, 
effluent treatment and disposal. Pollution of water bodies was also put under spotlight to 
avoid the deterioration in the quality of water and it became important for industrial users to 
recycle waters. While the Water Act 1956 was in place, various other Acts were promulgated, 
amended and repealed to cater for different local needs and serve the interests of the powerful 
and landed elite. These include, for example, amendments to the Southern Suburbs of Cape 
Town Water Supply Act (No. 29 of 1907) in 1952; the repeal of the Breede River 
Conservation District Adjustment Act (No. 24 of 1950); and the amendment of the Kilo 
litreipdrift Settlement Act (No. 23 of 1947) by Act No. 50 of 1963 Thompson (2005).  
 
Table 2: Some of the repealed water-related Acts 
Number and year of 
Act 
Short title Extent of repeal 
Act 54 of 1956 Water Act 1956 Sections 26A to 26H and 107 to 
138 
Act 29 of 1964 Rand Water Board The whole 
Act 89 of 1981 Water Amendment Act, 1981 The whole 
Act 39 of 1988 
(Bophuthatswana) 
North-West Water Supply 
Authority Act, 1988 
The whole 
Source: Water Services Act (108 of 1997) 
 
The Water Act 1956 differentiated between public and private forms of water. Public water 
referred to normal flow and surplus water that flowed in the bed of a public stream, while 
private water included spring water, ground water that was not derived from a public stream 
after its abstraction or water that overflowed naturally during a flood from a public stream 
(Thompson 2005). Although in principle it was easy to distinguish the two forms of water, it 
                                                        
11 Riparian principles under English law entitled a land owner unlimited rights to use water that flowed through his land as 
he pleased, without consideration for other land owners above- or downstream. 
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often required the courts to rule on claims over these forms of water. Interestingly, private 
water could change to public water if it joined other flowing water in a public stream, but that 
change was not effective outside the public stream. 
 
Given the complicated nature of water legislation that was tailor made to serve the interests of 
the few land owners, it became necessary for the various pieces of legislation to be 
streamlined to provide the water to more people. Legislation progressively shaped the 
provision of water services, especially to the urban poor, who by virtue of their socio-
economic status, and other discriminatory laws, were further marginalized. The fight against 
the oppressive apartheid regime saw the withholding of payment for essential services such as 
water and electricity by the urban poor, loosely described as the ‘culture of non-payment’.  
 
3.2.3 Neo-liberal approach to water 
The transition of water reform laws after apartheid was part of a deliberate move to 
acknowledge the new political dispensation, and take into account the needs of the majority of 
South Africans who had suffered deprivation under the previous oppressive government.  
 
The transition from RDP to GEAR presented a different way of responding to global political 
and economic changes and saw South Africa shift its orientation in line with the existing neo-
liberal approach to development. Warigu (2008) argues that the apartheid government, by 
virtue of its selective development principles, had put in place a market approach to water that 
was dominated by the commercial farming sector at the expense of other sectors. The new 
democratic government emphasized the human rights approach to the procurement and 
distribution of water, and aimed to provide water for basic use for everyone. 
 
Therefore, this shift from the riparian principle, which had guided water allocation and was 
used by the apartheid government to assist white landowners, to the Constitutional 
imperatives that promote equity and opportunity in access to water, illustrates the changes in 
the historical focus of water management.  
 
The challenge that faces water management is the growth of competing users as well as  
economic growth, leading to a need for innovative ways to manage the resource efficiently. 
South Africa’s water resources are said to be scarce, a situation that has given rise to the need 
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to conserve, protect and manage them effectively to ensure that they are available for many 
years to come.  
 
3.2.4 Millennium Development Goals  
Access to safe drinking water and to sanitation plays a pivotal role in the realization of all the 
Millenium Development Goals (MDGs). Soussan (2004) acknowledges that meeting water 
needs for the poor goes beyond just the provision of drinking water to providing livelihoods 
through irrigation or animal husbandry. Soussan adds that current home-based allocation 
systems could be perceived as prescriptive because they focus on basic needs, which do not 
accommodate any livelihood activities, such as vegetable gardening that could assist 
households provide their own food security and thus work their way out of cycles of poverty. 
Water security is an integral part of any household. According to South Africa’s 2010 MDG 
report, there has been a significant improvement in the proportion of households with access 
to clean water. In 1995, 60% had access to clean water and this proportion improved by 25% 
in 2003 to 85% of households. Similarly, access to sanitation improved from 49% in 1994 to 
63% in 2003 (South Africa MDG Report 2010), although it lagged behind access to water. 
Although the figures reflected in the report show a significant improvement in access to both 
water and sanitation services, it is how communities access water that is important and is not 
shown in the report. Protests by poor communities in Soweto’s Phiri settlement are indicative 
of the struggle by poor people to access adequate water for their needs. However, it is 
important to note that access to water and sanitation did improve through post-apartheid 
reforms, which were implemented to redress the unequal access to resources perpetuated by 
the apartheid regime’s policies (Geneva: COHRE 2009). 
 
3.3  The Constitution and the right to water 
The South African Constitution (Act No 108 of 1996) formed the basis of the comprehensive 
water policy reform following the demise of apartheid. The Constitution’s comprehensive Bill 
of Rights includes the right of access to water, among other social and economic rights.  
 
As mentioned above, Section 27(1)(b) identifies access to water as a right to be enjoyed by all 
citizens and exhorts the state to take  
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reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realization of each of these rights (RSA Constitution Act 108 of 1996 
S(27)(2)). 
 
Gleick (1999) emphasizes that access to basic water is a fundamental human right supported 
by international law, declarations and state practice. 
 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution outlines that the three spheres of government (national, 
provincial and municipal) are not only interdependent but also interrelated and should 
therefore cooperate and coordinate their functions and legislations. The Constitution identifies 
cooperative governance and integration as being the key to effective policy management. It is 
the duty of the national and provincial governments to support and ensure that municipalities 
carry out their functions, which also include providing water supply and sanitation services to 
their communities. 
 
However, this obligation is further qualified by ‘reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources’, which gives the state room within which not only to determine 
the content of this right of access to water, but also to empower policymakers to make 
determinations on the reasonableness of the measures to be used. This alone limits the right of 
access to water. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the Constitution obligates the 
state to give effect to the realization of the right but does not provide ‘for the right of 
individuals to access water’. It is neither an all-encompassing right, but an access right (du 
Plessis 2010); nor does it give a timeframe within which the right to access water must be 
realised.  
 
In addition, the language used to express the obligation of the state in the realization of these 
rights is protective and shows foresight on the side of the drafters to contain future legal 
challenges. Du Plessis (2010) observes that the drafters of the Constitution took into account 
the likelihood of limited state resources, hence the realistic ‘progressive realization’ of the 
right. The reasonableness of legislative and other measures is not defined and leaves room for 
interpretation, which would appear to give the state more power than the individual who is 
dependent on the state for resources. It remains questionable whether ‘reasonableness’ can 
actually protect the poor. Of even greater concern is the assertion ‘within its available 
resources’ because it could potentially be open to misinterpretation: it does not set the basis 
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upon which it is determined whether the available resources are adequate to achieve the 
realization of these rights. It is not clear what happens to citizens if resources are deemed 
inadequate. Section 27(1) of the Constitution does not define what constitutes a ‘sufficient’ 
amount of water. The question is whether it is desirable for the Constitution to specify the 
amount of water required by individuals. However, it is worth noting that different countries 
specify different quantities of water per person per day: the United States regards 450 litres 
per person per day as adequate, while in the United Kingdom 145 litres per person per day 
(UNDP Human Development Report 2006). In South Africa, DWAF (2001) defined ‘basic 
water supply’ to mean 25 litres per person per day, available within 200 metres of a 
household. This is in line with the standards set by World Health Organisation’s short-term 
minimum requirement for survival (WHO 2001). Interestingly, this minimum short-term 
requirement was adopted by DWAF as the basis for what it then promoted as the basic 
requirement espoused by WHO, and ignores the emphasis on the short-term nature of this 
requirement. 
 
Although South Africa’s water scarcity has been advanced as one of the reasons for the 
regulation and control of water usage, it would appear that such control targets the poor; while 
the rich do not have the same regulations put in place to control their consumption. In 
addition, the free lifeline is available for all households, irrespective of their ability to pay. 
 
Gabru (2005) observes that the phrase ‘right to have access to’ restricts the right to water as 
an indirect right. In this regard, the state only has to provide water depending on its ‘available 
resources’ and is therefore under no obligation to do so, unless citizens have inadequate 
means to meet their basic needs. In the same vein, Gowlland-Gualtieri (2003) argues that the 
question of the justiciability of the social and economic rights as enshrined in the Constitution 
remains central to the right to water. 
 
In the Phiri case,
12
 Judge Moroa Tsoka of the Johannesburg High Court ruled in favour of 
residents who had challenged two aspects of the City of Johannesburg’s water delivery 
service. Residents sought to the opportunity to have conventional water meters in place of 
prepaid meters, and wanted access to sufficient water for their needs (Bond & Dugard 2006). 
This was a ground-breaking case over what residents believed was a breach of their 
                                                        
12 Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus 
curiae) CCT 39/09. Case no 06/13865 in the Johannesburg High Court 
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Constitutional rights to access adequate water for their needs. The applicants, along with 
others in Phiri, had been forced to accept either prepaid meters or standpipes as the only 
options open to them, or else complete disconnection from the water supply. The historical 
background to this water issue stemmed from the apartheid days when the municipal officials 
were concerned with quelling political activism in Soweto rather than regulating payment for 
water and electricity services. A flat rate was charged and residents had access to an unlimited 
water supply, which on its own was problematic because it did not take into consideration the 
volume of water consumed by each household. Bond and Dugard (2006) point out that this 
state of affairs was acceptable to residents, who incurred high bills because of the laxity of 
credit control by the municipality. Unlimited water consumption and rising arrears became 
untenable for the City of Johannesburg after 1994 and it sought to implement cost recovery, 
as there was no longer any political imperative to continue with the status quo. In 2002, the 
City of Johannesburg launched Operation Gcin’amanzi in Soweto as an attempt to solve the 
problems of unlimited consumption by residents and rising arrears. 
 
3.3.1 The Constitution as the catalyst for water sector reform 
As previously mentioned, the review of legislation on water gave rise to the promulgation of 
both the National Water Act (No. 36 of 1998) and the Water Services Act (No. 108 of 1997). 
Arguably the Constitution provided an enabling environment for these changes to take place. 
Gowlland-Gualtieri (2003) acknowledges South Africa’s adoption of progressive laws and 
policy frameworks as recognition of the constitutional call for the right of access to water. 
Similarly, Marjanovi  et al (2011) observed the positive changes after the 1994 democratic 
elections, which paved the way for wholesome policy reforms in all sectors, including the 
water sector. 
 
The democratically elected ANC government has largely been successful in expanding access 
to water by poor communities, which previously had little or no access to water and 
sanitation. For impoverished communities this brought much-needed relief, although it rather 
pales in comparison to white and middle-class households that have piped water in their 
houses. Francis (2005) decries the fact that the number of households with access to basic 
water represents only a fraction of those without access to potable water. In addition, those 
with access to water, especially in the townships, suffer from the lack of adequate 
maintenance of water infrastructure and from poor delivery systems, coupled with high water 
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prices and frequent cut-offs due to non-payment. The situation looks bleak for these 
households, and government’s long-term vision of moving them up the water ladder, from 
standpipe to yard tap to in-house connection, remains a big challenge. 
 
3.3.2 Post-apartheid legislation and access to water 
This section discusses various pieces of legislation that govern accessible and equitable water 
provision in post-apartheid South Africa, as opposed to the discriminatory laws of the past. 
Francis (2005) makes a direct link between the current inequality in access to water with the 
apartheid government’s land and water policies. Land was reserved for whites through the 
discriminatory Natives Land Act of 1913. Similarly, the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 1923, 
prevented the black people from moving freely to cities, and this resulted in them being 
pushed to over-crowded and unproductive homelands, while the white South Africans 
enjoyed comfortable living conditions (Francis ibid). 
 
3.3.3 Water Services Act (No. 108 of 1997)  
The democratic South African Parliament drafted and passed the Water Services Act (No. 108 
of 1997) to further clarify government’s responsibility for providing basic water services to 
the people. The Act assists municipalities to undertake their roles as water services authorities 
and to provide water to those living within their jurisdictions. However, although the Act 
gives guidelines on basic water provision and pricing techniques it does not prescribe strict 
implementation timelines within which this should be achieved, thus leaving residents at the 
mercy of water service providers. It is only when the FBW was introduced in 2001 that 
various municipalities pursued their pricing policies in order to implement this basic right to 
water. A baseline potable water provision was adopted as part of the RDP minimum standard 
and 6kilo litre.  
 
3.3.4 The National Water Act (No. 36 of 1998)  
The National Water Act pays specific regard to water demand management and creates a 
broad legal framework that legislates the protection, use, development, conservation, 
management and control of water. The National Water Act considers the environment as 
‘user’ and states that: 
 
After providing for the basic needs of its citizens, the only other water that is provided 
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as a right, is the Environmental Reserve – to protect the ecosystems that underpin our 
water resources, now and into the future … it is the duty of national government …to 
assess the needs of the Environmental Reserve and to ensure that this amount of water, 
of an appropriate quality is set aside (DWAF 1997:24). 
 
It also includes provisions not only to ensure equal access to water, but also to take positive 
action to redress racial and gender imbalances in water use (Seetal and Quibell 2005). 
 
The National Water Policy (1997) pronounced water as an ‘indivisible national asset’ (DWAF 
2004:7) and called for decentralization of the water-resource management system to include 
stakeholder participation within demarcated areas (Warigu 2008). In addition, government 
would assume the responsibility of “custodian of water resources, and its powers in this 
regard exercised as public trust” (DWAF 2004:7). This was a symbolic shift from the 
previous dispensation where water was in the hands of the few, to one where the government 
would assume responsibility to ensure equitable access to water for every individual. This 
policy led to the enactment of the Water Services Act of 1997 and the National Water Act of 
1998, both of which uphold and recognize the rights and freedoms of access to water. Abrams 
(1996) acknowledges that although the shift from riparian law to a human rights approach to 
water governance gave DWAF a political mandate to fulfil people’s expectations of equitable 
access to water, its implementation was not guaranteed. On paper, the approach encouraged 
public participation, a practice that was not visible under successive white governments. 
 
There were challenges in implementing the water resources strategy, including poor 
infrastructure, lack of skilled manpower and a dearth of technological expertise. Peer (2001) 
notes that the new democratic government did not fully disclose the existence of phased 
implementation of the National Water Policy and this led to boycotts and protests against 
perceived lack of water service delivery.  
 
3.3.5 The Municipal Structures Act (No. 33 of 2000) 
The Municipal Structures Act assigns the responsibility for water services to the District 
municipality. This development has seen district municipalities assume the role of service 
providers,  “deviating from the original conception of coordinators and supporters of and 
equalisers between local municipalities” Steytler (2000:228).  Steytler adds that the district 
municipalities share both administrative and legislative powers with local municipalities in 
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their area. The division of functions and powers between the two is largely dependent on the 
capacity and needs of the local municipalities. 
 
3.3.6 The Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) 
The Municipal Systems Act focuses on municipalities’ internal systems and administration. 
The Act introduces the differentiation between the function of an authority and that of a 
provider. It also identifies the importance of alternative mechanisms for providing municipal 
services and sets out certain requirements for entering into partnerships.  
 
Mackintosh et al (2004) acknowledge that the introduction of new municipal systems, water 
policies and financial frameworks changed the face of water services provision in South 
Africa. Before 1994 approximately 14 to 18 million people had no access to water services 
while a further 21 million had inadequate sanitation (Van der Merwe 2003). The repealing of 
various legislation discussed earlier in the report, enabled the previously disadvantaged 
groups to access water for their basic needs. 
 
3.4 Water subsidies  
This section discusses water subsidies, the targeted households and impact of subsidies on the 
quality of water services provided to households. South Africa’s subsidy system, the FBW, 
addresses issues of equity given the historical imbalances in service provision by the 
apartheid government. This section also discusses how the poor can be ‘discriminated’ against 
using policies such as the Indigent Policy
13
 to provide services to them. The labelling of the 
poor classifies them as ‘special’ people that are treated differently, and makes it convenient 
for decisions to be made on their behalf without prior consultation. Although the FBW policy 
was designed to benefit the poor, the challenges of its implementation resulted in everyone 
benefitting regardless of their ability to pay. Water limiting measures were put in place in the 
delivery of water, especially to poor households, which was a subtle cost-recovery strategy 
disguised as a policy to improve the quality of life of the poor. Cost recovery describes a 
process by which a service provider recoups all or some of the costs linked to the provision of 
                                                        
13 The Indigent Policy was designed to redress the inequalities perpetuated by the apartheid government by assisting 
households that struggle to pay their rates and service charges. The indigent are those sections of the population that are 
unable to pay for their basic needs and services. To qualify for the grant applicants have to meet to predetermined criteria 
such as income, ownership of property and status of occupancy. The value of the property they occupy  must also be within 
the limit set by the municipality (City of Cape Town 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
  48 
any services, whether they are operating, maintenance or infrastructural costs. McDonald 
(2002) points out the difference between private and public sector providers in that the former 
expect to make a profit whilst the latter are not under pressure to make a profit out of the cost 
recovery process.  
 
3.4.1 Free Basic Water Policy: Rationale for use as a tool for accessing water  
As discussed elsewhere in this study, the introduction of free basic water by government in 
2001 was part of water management strategies aimed at ensuring that everyone had access to 
water for their basic needs. The policy was initiated to redress apartheid-induced inequality in 
access to water by the poor, and in the process to improve public health, gender and equity as 
well as fulfilling individual South Africans’ constitutional rights to access water. Although 
the FBW policy sought to alleviate the suffering especially of the poor, Bond & Dugard 
(2008) dismissed its timing as a political ploy by the ruling ANC designed to win votes, given 
that it was during the run-up to the local government elections. The ANC had promised to  
“provide all residents with a free amount of water … those who use more than the 
basic, will pay for the extra they use” (Bond & Dugard 2008:7) 
 
Under this policy, households receive 6kilo litre water free every month, irrespective of their 
ability to pay. The implementation of the FBW policy was challenging, hence the blanket 
provision of free water to all households irrespective of their ability to pay. Water users who 
can afford to pay for water benefit while those whom this was targeted at, find themselves at 
the raw end, facing similar challenges of inadequate resources as before, although the 
difference being that they at least have access to free water. The point of departure is the 
implementation of this access, where the poor have regulated access to supposedly free water 
through technological intervention in the form of pre-paid meters, trickilo litreers and WMDs, 
among others. The use of these interventions ensures that poor households are prevented from 
consuming more water than rich households, which, even if they exceed the free water 
allocation, can afford to pay for water and often do not get penalised for their ‘excessive’ 
water use. Households that do not rely solely on free water can enter into payment agreements 
with the water provider, in this case, the City, and pay for their water in instalments. In most 
instances, they can negotiate arrangements not to have their water supply cut off. The major 
difference is that they make human contact to set up these payment arrangements whereas the 
technological intervention cuts off that interface, and dehumanizes the process. 
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The FBW policy operates on the notion that water is a scarce resource that needs to be 
managed and conserved. However, Illich and Gronemeyer (1993) criticise the notion of ‘basic 
needs’ as a by-product of development that seeks to measure humanity according to standards 
of decency and normality. Accordingly, these basic needs are expressed in technical 
measurements and monetary terms to give credence to their existence. Smith (2010) argues 
that the justification of FBW was in line with the contrived humanitarian crisis approach that 
sought to solve physiological needs through scientific methods. In addition, provision of 
FBW with the support of the indigent policy not only enables poor households to access free 
water but also ensures non-disconnection when they exceed their free allocation (Smith 
2010). This ensures that households, especially large ones, access financial benefits associated 
with the FBW and the indigent grant.  
 
However, various factors affect water scarcity and Mehta (2000) outlines four notions of 
scarcity – the biophysical and ecological attributes determining water availability; temporal 
and cyclical dimensions; distributional and relational attributes of scarcity; and anthropogenic 
dimensions of scarcity. It is important to understand the multifaceted nature of water scarcity 
so as to avoid addressing the problem with one blanket explanation. According to Mehta 
(2000), the experience of water scarcity is not homogenous, and therefore requires a multi-
pronged approach and not a single solution. Arguably, if the implementation of FBW 
provides a lasting solution to South Africa’s water problems, then the controversial 
installation of prepaid meters in Orange Farm and Durban, among other places would not 
have caused distress to the affected residents. Currently, the regulation of FBW is prevalent in 
poor communities giving rise to criticisms that this approach victimizes them but leaves the 
well-to-do able to access water without punitive limitations. 
 
Although water was heavily subsidized during the apartheid era, this was done through 
racially designed policies that saw the black majority with inadequate access to water supply. 
Therefore the FBW subsidy is significant in that it not only addresses issues of access based 
on income or ability to pay, but equitable access to water by everyone as part of the reform of 
the water sector. As a subsidy, FBW is double-sided because its implementation serves to 
redress imbalances of the past but it also becomes part of the cost recovery strategy. While the 
introduction of the FBW policy has been viewed by some critics as politically motivated, 
others have viewed it as an attempt to correct inequalities.  
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The implementation of FBW policy poses challenges especially for poor rural municipalities 
because of the income profile of their residents, which in turn affects the sustainability of the 
programme. Given the poor financial position of several municipalities, the implementation of 
the FBW is a great challenge. Where urban municipalities have made strides to provide FBW 
services, some rural municipalities may still be in the first stages of the implementation of the 
policy. DWAF (2002) acknowledges the financial, socio-political, institutional and technical 
challenges that affect the implementation of the FBW policy. The financial aspect involves 
the ability to sustainably fund targeted households, given the disparities in different 
municipalities. The socio-political challenges involve ensuring cooperation of various 
stakeholders such as communities, local councillors and government officials through the 
establishment and management of effective communication channels. Similarly with 
institutional challenges, there is need to develop working relationships between different 
organisations, and the technical aspect involves choosing appropriate technical and service 
level options to facilitate the provision of free water. These challenges pose genuine 
difficulties and frustrations for both municipalities and consumers. 
 
Since there is no commonly accepted definition of poverty,
14
 levels of income have been 
loosely used as one approach to identify poor households. This is, however, not a watertight 
approach as various factors come into play that makes it unreliable. Given this complexity, it 
is easier for local authorities and municipalities to provide blanket lifeline water to all 
households irrespective of their income levels. It is this lifeline of 6kilo litre that is regulated 
to ‘poor’ households through various interventions such as WMDs, trickilo litreers and pre-
paid water meters in different places throughout the country.  
 
Gowlland-Gualtieri (2003) reiterates that although the implementation of the right to water 
has resulted in the development of the FBW policy for domestic use and consumption, huge 
inequalities remain as a result of the apartheid legacy and the application of the economic 
approach to water policy. The latter approach manifests in terms of cost recovery and 
privatization, which has contributed to the challenges faced by the poor in access to water for 
their basic needs and sanitation. Further, Gowlland-Gualtieri (2003) expresses concern that as 
far as the water policy is concerned, the radical legal policy reform has seemingly not 
translated into meaningful improvement for the poor majority in the country. 
                                                        
14 Households are still required to prove their income or lack of it when applying for the indigent grant. 
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3.4.2 The Indigent Policy as a cost recovery tool 
The Department of Local Government (2008) defines indigence as ‘lacking in the necessities 
of life’. The Indigent Policy is based on the Constitution (Section 27(2)) and the Municipal 
Systems Act (2000). Section 27 (2) of the Constitution states that:  
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
 
According to the guidelines given by the Constitution these basic necessities are water, 
sanitation, refuse removal, environmental health, energy, housing, healthcare and food. The 
Municipal Services Act (2000) sets provisions for targeted tariffs through the Indigent Policy 
but emphasises the cost effectiveness of municipal services. 
 
 Although the indigent grant is designed to benefit struggling households, it is the 
responsibility of each Municipality throughout the country to come up with its own strategy 
of implementing the policy, depending on available resources. The grant enables indigents to 
have access to water and Smith (2010) describes it as a tool that makes it possible for 
households to access water if the FBW supply runs out. The grant of R40.00 per month 
provides additional water supply for the beneficiary households, thus supplementing the FBW 
supply.  
 
Although both the indigent grant and FBW are designed to help the beneficiaries have access 
to water, it is this same water that is regulated through various technological interventions 
such as washers, WMDs and prepaid meters, thus patronizing them in a way that is not done 
to other sections of the community. Although the Constitution is clear about the rolling out of 
government services and benefits without discrimination, the availability of resources puts 
that into disarray especially for municipalities that have limited financial capacity. This 
invariably affects the provision of free basic services to indigent households. The water 
reforms implemented in post-apartheid South Africa seek to improve access to water for 
every citizen regardless of race and economic position. The reclassification of the poor as 
indigents raises concerns as it reincarnates the apartheid notion of discrimination. Even 
though this reclassification could arguably be viewed as positive discrimination, it still means 
that the poor have no right to make their own decisions..  
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In Cape Town, the Indigent Policy covers arrears, grants and payments of services to ensure 
that the poor have access to basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity (van 
Ryneveld et al 2003). This policy can also be used as a tool to keep the poor in line and make 
sure that they conform to the set policies by ensuring that they only access predetermined 
quantities of free water and electricity.  
 
The Makana
15
 Municipality in the Eastern Cape defines indigent households as ‘households 
or ratepayers that fall within the qualifying criteria of being declared poor and qualify for 
financial assistance through the Assistance to the Poor/Indigent Policy’ (Makana Municipality 
2007). It is interesting to note that Makana Municipality also refers to the Indigent Policy as 
‘Assistance to the Poor’, but also acknowledges the complexity of defining poverty by relying 
solely on income as the prime indicator. However, in implementing its Indigent Policy, it 
would seem that the Municipality uses the income factor as the major determinant of the 
poverty status of the household. It provides 10kilo litre of free water for households after 
which a step tariff applies for water used above this amount. Like the City of Cape Town, 
Makana Municipality’s extent of indigent support includes water, electricity; refuse 
collection, sewerage and rates assessment. Cape Town defines a certain level of income as the 
defining indigence and largely uses property values as a determinant factor.  
 
3.4.3 Tariffs as a cost recovery tool  
Tariffs constitute an important source of revenue for municipalities and the push for cost 
recovery influences the steep tariff structures after the free lifeline to enable municipalities to 
recoup income. Inadequate funding from national government presents challenges for poor 
municipalities in the implementation of free basic water. National government determines the 
principles and minimum national norms and standards for tariff setting, while the local Water 
Service Authorities have the constitutional mandate to set water tariffs in their jurisdictions. 
Although DWAF has the power to impose price-caps on water tariffs, it cannot prescribe the 
exact levels or prices of tariffs. However, it is envisaged that it will exercise a regulatory role 
over Water Service Authorities. South Africa’s water tariffs are a major source of revenue for 
water services. Flynn & Chirwa (2005:65) observe that in South Africa, access to water is 
increasingly determined by consumer tariffs that “seek to cover full cost of service”. The 
                                                        
15 Makana Local Municipality in the Eastern Cape is named after a Xhosa prophet and serves a population of 
approximately 70 000 people. It has 12 wards, three of which are in the rural areas of the Municipality.  
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various water tariffs, as illustrated in the table below, reflect the complexity of tariff structures 
and the achievement of set objectives vis-à-vis affordability of water.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Performance of various tariff options against design objectives 
Tariff structure Cost recovery Objectives/equity Affordability  
Fixed charge Adequate  
 
Provides stable cash 
flow if set at 
appropriate levels, 
but utility may be 
vulnerable to resale 
of water and 
spiralling 
consumption. 
Poor  
 
People who use 
large quantities of 
water pay the same 
as those who use 
little. 
Adequate 
 
If differentiated by 
ability to pay, but 
households are 
unable to reduce 
their bills by 
economizing on 
water use.  
Uniform volumetric Good  
 
If set at an 
appropriate level, 
moreover revenues 
adjust automatically 
to changing 
consumption. 
Good  
 
People pay 
according to how 
much they actually 
use. 
Good 
 
Can be 
differentiated by 
ability to pay, and 
people can limit 
their bills by 
reducing 
consumption. 
Increasing (rising) 
tariff blocks (ITBs) 
Good  
 
But only if the size 
and height of the 
blocks are well 
designed. 
 
Poor 
 
People do not pay 
according to the 
costs that their 
water use imposes 
on the utility. 
Poor  
 
Penalizes poor 
families with large 
households and/or 
shared 
connections. 
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Decreasing block 
tariff 
Good  
 
But only if the size 
and height of the 
blocks are well 
designed. 
 
 
Poor  
 
People do not pay 
according to the 
costs that their 
water use imposes 
on the utility. 
 
Poor  
 
Penalizes poor 
families with low 
levels of 
consumption. 
 
 
 
Source: Whittington et al (2002) 
 
 
Regulation 10(2) of the Regulations relating to National Standards and Measures to Conserve 
Water (Compulsory National Standards) requires that services provided to consumers be 
measured and quantified according to user sectors. In this regard, the Water Service Authority 
is expected to differentiate consumers in accordance with their consumption patterns – for 
example, industrial consumers should be differentiated from residential, commercial and 
agricultural consumers – so that it would be able to measure consumption levels accurately, 
and plan accordingly. This differentiation of consumers would enable the Water Service 
Authority to institute appropriate tariff structures for each sector.  
 
Similarly, municipal councils are required under the Municipal Systems Act (2000) to 
implement tariff policies that reflect principles that ensure poor households have access to 
basic services. Tissington et al (2008) argue that the City of Cape Town has partially ring-
fenced water services financially, while the City of Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality, municipalities such as Mangaung and Mogalakwena, as well as 
district municipalities such as iLembe and Vhembe, to name a few, also financially ring 
fenced
16
 their water services. DWAF’s National Water Services Regulation Strategy promotes 
ring fencing of water services to improve financial efficiency. However, although McDonald 
acknowledges that theoretically it enables the effective use of funds, he expresses reservations 
about the practice of ring fencing, citing the cholera outbreak in 2000 in rural KwaZulu Natal 
                                                        
16
 Ring-fencing means that finances set aside for water services are separate from those of other municipal 
functions through the corporatization of the water services provider. 
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as a direct result of the implementation of full cost recovery measures. According to 
Tissington et al (2008), out of the 284 municipalities, eight have achieved partial financial 
ring fencing of their water services. 
 
The South African Government’s adoption of lifeline tariffs was in line with its policy to 
ensure that all South Africans had access to water for their basic needs (DWAF 1997 - The 
White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa). The tariff policy reflects the value 
of water as an economic resource, and how costs incurred in its provision should be 
recovered.  It is designed to promote efficient use of the water resource. It is in this scenario 
that the WMDs have been located by the City, as part of it cost-recovery strategy to ensure 
that poor households only use water that they can afford. In this case, the free basic water 
lifeline available to all households is regulated through WMDs for some households in 
Atlantis, including the study site Saxonsea.  
 
According to the City, this regulation ensures that those households have access to 350 litres 
per day, throughout the month. If they stick to this amount, they do not have to pay for water 
at all. 
 
3.5 History of water metering in South Africa 
This section discusses the role of water metering as a direct response to water demand 
management. A brief historical background of universal water metering in the City of Durban 
sets the tone for the current water metering strategies employed throughout South Africa. 
Durban saw the introduction of the first steps of implementing the FBW of 200 litres per 
household per day in response to the problem of access to water by the poor. 
 
Loftus (2006) traces the history of domestic water metering in the City of Durban, as tabled in 
the municipal government in 1919, 1934 and 1948. This was in response to debates that had 
raged about ‘hedonistic’ domestic water usage by households, viewed as posing a threat to the 
City’s industrial and economic progress. Check meters were piloted in the city on some 
properties to monitor water use at the recommendation of the City Engineer Alec Kinmont
17
 
in the 1950s (City Engineer’s report 1959, in Loftus 2006). The results showed high rates of 
                                                        
17 City Engineer Alec Kinmont’s report revealed high usage volumes of water by residents and implied that this 
was linked to actual needs, either socially or biologically constituted. The racial slur was hardly disguised. 
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unmetered water usage, racially profiled as follows: Whites – 72 gallons per day;18 Asiatics 
and Coloureds – 52 gallons; Bantu groups – 34 gallons. The effect of the check meters saw a 
reduction in daily consumption levels to 40, 10 and 6 gallons respectively, with the 
assumption that this was an indication of households’ ability to pay for water used. It is 
important to note that racial profiling was used to measure water use and hence the implied 
connotations about ability to pay. This ‘experiment’ formed a foundation of using water 
pricing as a disciplinary tool to control household’s excessive use of water, and in the process 
racially defined the consumption patterns (Loftus 2006).  
 
According to Loftus (2006), Engineer Kinmont projected reasonable water use by the three 
racial groups to be 50, 35, and 20 gallons per day respectively, which, if translated into 
current terms, is a very generous allocation of 43.75 litres per person per day for those who 
rely on the lifeline allocation. The report recommended the installation of water meters 
throughout the municipality, and the City Council only accepted the universal metering of all 
properties in 1970. Loftus argues that the formation of the semi-commercialised Water Board 
and its desire to increase profit margins gave rise to what he refers to as ‘commodity 
fetishism’. The water meters assumed a powerful role in poor households as a reminder that 
there was a new way of doing things. It is in this line of thought that Loftus describes the 
water meter as ‘creeping dictator’ in that it controls the amount of water available for 
households’ consumption. Looking at Kinmont’s recommendations for racial water 
allocation, it is ironic that this thought process is similar to what post-apartheid Durban would 
recommend as FBW for poor communities: 200 litres per household of eight per day, 
translating to 25 litres per person per day, slightly higher than Kinmont’s 20 gallons per 
household (90.92 litres).  
 
After South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, the water sector experienced large-
scale reforms through a rigorous consultative process. Both the legal and policy reforms 
covered various aspects of water management including rights to water, reforms in the water 
management and supply institutions, protection of environmental flows and provision of 
FBW (Schreiner & Hassan 2011).  
 
                                                        
18 1 UK gallon is equal to 4.55 litres 
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3.6 Types of water meters 
A water meter is a device used to measure and monitors water consumption at a given 
location, and benefits both the utility and customer insofar as it enables them to curb their 
expenditure patterns. Mutikanga et al (2010) argue that in universally metered utilities, water 
meters can be ‘cash’ registers generating revenue for utilities, which is then used for ‘system 
maintenance and infrastructure improvements’. They argue that inefficient metering and low 
tariffs can affect the financial sustainability of utilities. Saglin (2005) argues that self-
disconnection and self-rationing reduce opportunities for collective action, as access to water 
becomes an individual affair.  
 
Flynn & Chirwa (2005:66 in McDonald & Ruiters 2005) argue that the use of any form of 
technological intervention places undue limit on people’s ability to ‘enjoy other 
constitutionally protected rights’ and therefore limits their constitutional right to access water.  
 
On the other hand, van Zyl (2011) advocates for water restriction in areas where it is deemed 
uneconomical to implement conventional or pre-paid metering systems, as a way to control 
water consumption. This way, consumers get cheap or free water, with an added benefit of 
limiting wastage and controlling leaks. The provision of water services has been said to be 
costly, hence the need for payment. However, critics including Bond (2005) argue that the 
measurement of water itself is a form of control of access to the resource. The argument that 
water provision is more than a resource is shown by restrictions around its use. For indigent 
households, restriction is a condition of access, as evidenced by the myriad technical 
interventions to ensure that these households use only the FBW. Smith (2010) views the 
benefit of free water as contrived because the restricted access carries ‘social and health 
burdens’. 
 
3.6.1. Flow restrictors  
These are devices that restrict either the flow rate or the volume of water received by a 
consumer. The effectiveness of these devices is that they reduce the water flow to a trickilo 
litree, hence reduces the amount of water used per day. However, this makes it prone to being 
tampering with for a faster flow rate. Supply can be shut off if the daily set volume is 
exhausted, often with associated health and social burdens to the affected households.  
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3.6.2 Electronic flow limiters  
These are devices that require a direct connection with a flow meter and which can dispense a 
predetermined volume of water (typically programmed by the operator to allow 200 litres per 
day). They use electronics and thus require power supplies or batteries (Van Zyl 2010). 
Besides being mechanically sophisticated, these meters are expensive too. Marvin, Laurie & 
Napier (2001) argue that although prepayment practices are well established in South Africa, 
for example in the electricity sector, the water sector is complex and has been plagued by 
resistance by the affected households because in the past, water was provided at a flat rate to 
individual households, some of who did or did not pay for the service. Additional pressure has 
been put on municipalities as they became autonomous of both the provincial and national 
governments. They have had to ensure cost recovery for services and accordingly tried to 
implement prepayment systems in individual households, to the chagrin of the consumers 
who resisted such moves.  
 
On the other hand, prepaid electricity has been accepted, mainly because it can be replaced by 
other alternative sources of energy such as firewood, and paraffin for lighting and cooking. 
Unlike electricity, water is irreplaceable hence the contention around its access to meet basic 
needs. 
 
3.6.3 Conventional house connection meter  
These meters are installed on properties and water consumed is paid for at the end of the 
month. Water is provided at high pressure into the house, and the flow is unregulated. 
Households do not need to prepay for water used and can enter into agreements with the 
service provider to still access water for their needs while settling their bills. Unlike those on 
either pre-paid or WMDs, water use is unlimited. The disadvantage of this system is that if 
there is a leak on the side of the consumer’s property, it could result in high bills and may be 
difficult to detect because of unlimited water flow. Errors in meter readings can result in high 
bills, and meters require manpower to conduct physical readings. Difficulty in accessing some 
properties could result in inaccurate estimated readings, which could translate to irregular 
billing. The problem of unreliable postal services also contributes to non-payment of bills. In 
addition, the service provider incurs costs trying to recover unpaid bills as well as manpower 
to disconnect services for non-payment. In addition, the aging water infrastructure system 
compounds water leakage and wastage. Given the apartheid regime’s historically skewed 
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water infrastructure, it is quite plausible that high volumes of water could have been lost as a 
result of poor infrastructure, especially in the black townships. 
 
3.6.4 Prepaid water meters 
The introduction of prepaid water meters was geared towards the provision of solutions to 
problems related to revenue collection on conventional meters for both the utility and end user 
(van Zyl 2010). Van Zyl adds that the massive implementation of the prepaid water meter 
technology in most parts of the country has been described as an alternative to conventional 
water meters for all types of users. Pre-paid meters are an embodiment of the privatisation of 
water services in South Africa and are a cost recovery innovation used to force poor/low 
income households to pay for accessing water. The meters can be set up to dispense free basic 
water, after which the user has to purchase prepayment tokens from central vending offices. 
This technology offers numerous advantages to the service providers and municipalities 
because it removes the need for monthly meter readings, data management, billing and debt 
collection services, thus reducing the attendant financial risks.  
 
DWAF (2007) commends the pre-payment system as ‘powerful tools for helping water 
service providers to control water wastage and customer debt’. The irony of the FBW policy 
is summarised succinctly by Loftus’s (2005) critical observation about why free water has 
translated into a restriction on supply to previously disadvantaged people: poor households 
are forced to decide how to allocate their meagre incomes to meet all their needs, resulting in 
choices being made around water consumption that can compromise health, as shown by the 
cholera outbreak in Durban following the use of unprotected water by households who could 
not afford to buy water for their basic needs (Loftus 2005). In Orange Farm informal 
settlement, residents resisted the installation of prepaid water meters by the City of 
Johannesburg, resulting in a court action
19
 instituted by a group of residents.  Although they 
eventually lost in the Constitutional Court, this resistance gave them a voice that forced 
authorities to consider their needs. 
 
                                                        
19 Lindiwe Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 
Case CCT 39/09 
[2009] ZACC 28 
Date of Judgment: 8 October 2009 
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Jaglin (2004) argues that under-investment in water infrastructure in townships mainly 
occupied by blacks during the apartheid era adversely affected the maintenance of the system, 
causing the ripple effect of dilapidation and poor services, which would continue to dog 
residents in post-apartheid times. This would explain why post-apartheid the improvement in 
water services would not have had a significant impact without the major revamping of the 
archaic water infrastructure system in poor townships. It is debatable that vast amounts of 
water could be lost in the system due to leakage caused by old water reticulation system. 
 
3.6.5 Water management devices 
These devices have been described by the City as a kind of water meter that replaces the 
existing conventional meter and is programmed to dispense a pre-set amount of water daily.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Water management device 
 
 
 
Source: Environmental Monitoring Group (2009) 
 
On its website, the manufacturer of the WMD, Utility Systems Corporation (USC) says the 
device was developed in response to the need to conserve water. USC describes the WMD as 
‘a low cost, intelligent, electronic valve capable of controlling water flow to a domestic 
consumer at high pressure’ (USC 2011 www.utility-systems.co.za). The device offers 
financial and operational benefits to the service provider and reduces consumption by as 
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much as 80%, while at the same time affording the consumer lifeline allocation of water. In 
this regard, it assists consumers to budget their daily consumption through a capped daily or 
monthly allowance, and encourages responsible water usage through the accumulation of 
unused daily allowances. It also assists in individual leak detection and allows for automated 
meter reading.  
 
Although the City was at pains to highlight the difference between the WMD and the pre-paid 
water meter, critics view it as a pre-paid meter in disguise because of the similarity in limiting 
access to water. The City’s Tariff Policy (2009/10) clearly spells out that its aim is to limit 
water supply to non-paying consumers through the WMD, thus throwing into disarray the 
official claim that the purpose of the device is related to water conservation or water demand 
management (City of Cape Town 2008).  
 
Although in its submission to Parliament the City argued that the WMDs programme was not 
targeted at poor households only, the concentration of these devices in areas of high 
consumption and high debt levels is evidence that the poor are the majority targets.  
 
Nleya et al (2012) argue that the high concentration of WMDs in poor areas compared with 
the low rate of installation in high-income areas, as shown in table 4 below, is evidence of the 
discrepancy with which water consumption is treated. Since 2009, more than 30 000 WMDs 
were installed in low-income areas (City of Cape Town 2009) compared to the negligible 
figures for similar installations in affluent areas. This negates the whole argument by the City 
that the implementation of the water leaks and detection project is meant to address the 
scarcity of the water resource currently experienced in Cape Town, if this intervention is 
largely targeted at the poor water consumers who are unable to pay for the service. What this 
implies is that, as long as a consumer is able to pay for the water service, they can use it as 
they like because they contribute revenue for the City. 
 
Table 4: Installation of WMDs in high-income areas in Cape Town 
Surburb Installations to December 
2010 
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Claremont 1 
Constantia 1 
Durbanville 2 
Diep River 1 
Forest Heights* 318 
Goodwood 19 
Plumstead 1 
Wetton 9 
Wynberg 10 
 
Source: Nleya et al (2012) 
*Forest Heights has property values mostly in the region of R400 000 to R500 000 and thus 
hardly qualifies as a high-income area. 
 
The pre-paid meter, on the other hand, ensures that water is paid for before it can be used thus 
reducing chances of non-payment. Both types of interventions aim at reducing unwarranted 
free access, over and above the official free basic supply, thus preventing non-paying 
consumers to freeload services for which they do not pay.  
 
Efteq Effective Technologies, one of the distributors of water meters in South Africa, describe 
three modes in which their ‘intelligent water meter’ can operate: the WMD mode, which 
controls daily consumption; the standard prepayment mode, which controls monthly water 
consumption; and the post-pay mode, in which a credit limit can be set (Thompson, Nleya, 
Masiya et al 2012). This description, if taken at face value, could be interpreted as an 
admission that the difference between the WMD and prepaid meters is a clever way to escape 
from public scrutiny as well as regulatory censure. 
 
3.6.6 Standpipes  
Standpipes provide water for larger populations especially in sprouting informal settlements, 
and have been accepted as providing better service for both plot owners and back yard 
dwellers. Standpipes often serve entire communities and the maximum distance from the 
furthest dwelling to the standpipe is 200 meters. Although the use of standpipes can be 
viewed as retrogressive when compared with on-site water, the fact that they provide water is 
a relief to households that have no other access to it, especially in the informal settlements, 
where it could be a challenge to install WMDs because of the haphazard settlement structures. 
The challenge with informal settlements is that most are temporary structures often built on 
areas not designated for housing and therefore lack proper sanitation facilities. 
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3.6.7 Tagged standpipes 
A variation of the ordinary standpipe is the tagged standpipe
20
 such as those in the Samora 
Machel informal settlement, in Philippi, targeted mostly at backyard dwellers. The tags enable 
the backyard dwellers to access their daily-allocated amount of 250 litres of free water, 
independent of the landlord’s daily allocation.  
 
3.6.8 Roof tanks or semi-pressure systems 
These were implemented in Durban’s eThekwini Municipality as a pro-poor water supply 
solution. They have, however, been plagued with payment and usage problems, with high 
reported levels of illegal upgrading from low to high pressure. The perception of inferiority 
has also negatively affected the assumed benefits of the roof tanks (Bruner et al 2010). 
 
3.7  What is Water Demand Management?  
Debates on water scarcity have raised environmental concerns regarding water service 
delivery and there have been calls for urgent intervention on the demand side of water rather 
than on its supply side. Proponents of water demand management argue that domestic water 
consumption (demand side) does not go back into the hydrological system unlike the 
agricultural sector, which is widely viewed as using vast amounts of water. Although the 
agricultural sector uses more water than the domestic sector, some of it goes back into the 
hydrological system through evaporation and plant transpiration. This is not to ignore the fact 
that pollution in this sector renders water unusable downstream, but measures can be taken to 
reduce wastage.  
 
Herbertson & Tate (2001:36) define water demand management as ‘the management of the 
total quantity of water abstracted from a source of supply using measures to control waste and 
undue consumption’. This definition is in line with the Dublin Statement 1992, which states 
that ‘Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an 
economic good’ (Solanes & Gonzalez-Villarreal 1996:27). 
 
The statement emphasizes that demand management policies should reflect the ‘role of water 
as an economic and life sustaining good through conservation, efficient use, recycling and re-
                                                        
20 Tagged standpipes in Philippi’s Samora Machel informal settlement enable backyard dwellers to access their own 250 
litres FBW without sharing with their landlord. However, the backyard dwellers share a toilet with their landlord. In 
Saxonsea, backyard dwellers share the same daily allocation with the landlord and do not have separate daily limit, as is the 
case in Samora Machel. 
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use’. The focus on demand management therefore requires a mind-set shift from the 
traditional supply-side orientation to conservation and demand management to ensure the 
sustainability of the resource and the environment (Herbertson & Tate 2001).  
 
Similarly, DWAF (1999) emphasizes the purpose of demand management strategies as 
achieving sustainable, efficient and affordable services to all consumers. The City (Samora 
Machel Scope of Works Q2009/10:4) views water demand management and water 
conservation as the ‘minimisation of network and on-site losses and/or inefficient use’, adding 
that in poor areas, these contributed to non-revenue demand because of non-payment of bills. 
The result is not only high water wastage but the accumulation of bills that burden the 
consumer and at the same time threaten the sustainability of the service. 
 
The City’s integrated water leaks repair project aimed at reducing unaccounted for water loss 
through the repair of leaks within residential properties, to ensure that indigent households 
used their allocated water. The City sought to ensure sustainable use of water and therefore 
needed to manage its demand through changing consumer behaviour. Its approach to water 
demand management is based on the premise that water is a precious, scarce and strategic 
resource that should not be wasted and has to be accounted for at all times. It is in this regard 
that it seeks to work together with both its citizens and stakeholders to develop long-term 
strategies to conserve water. 
 
As discussed elsewhere in this paper, the City embarked on a water demand strategy in 
indigent communities to reduce water loss through an integrated water leaks repair project 
and subsequent installation of WMDs. In addition to the FBW allocation of 6kilo litre, 
indigent households are also entitled 4.2kilo litre for basic sewerage discharge for a household 
size of eight members, without double occupation or any water-consuming businesses on their 
properties. It is important to note that the City had already specified the terms and conditions 
for the contractors to adhere to in order to implement the water leaks and repair project and 
required that community and household buy-in of the project be obtained. 
 
3.8 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter discussed water policies and legislation put in place to improve 
access to water by households that were not serviced during the apartheid era. Although great 
strides have been made in the water sector, the challenge remains of ensuring that all people 
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are connected to safe drinking water throughout the country. The indigent policy as an 
instrument to ensure basic access to water is important, but its implementation remains a 
challenge especially for financially weak municipalities. 
 
In South Africa, access to water has and continues to be a deeply politicized issue. The 
skewed apartheid water policies based on riparian law benefitted the landed few, who had 
access to both political and economic power. After apartheid, the new government attempted 
to improve access to water and posted significant success in ensuring that the majority of 
people could access tap water within 200m of their dwellings, especially in urban areas. 
Progressively, access to water is transformed into an individualized experience through which 
the water consumer is forced to interact with a water-regulating device, thus removing the 
human interactive process through which negotiation is possible.  
 
The WMDs installed in Atlantis, unlike the ones in Samora Machel, do not have display units 
to show how much water has been consumed, resulting in some households being unable to 
gauge how much they have left before it runs out. As a result, some households resort to 
drastic measures such as sharing bath water, a situation that is both as unpleasant as it is 
unhygienic. Not only has the regulation of water affected usage patterns, but most households 
reported sadness at having to give up gardening activities as they could not afford the water.  
 
That meter is a skelem
21
, we know that water must be conserved but to punish 
us with that meter is unfair. It cuts off water and we spend the whole day 
without water (Mr Green, interview 5 November 2011) 
 
                                                        
21 Skelem describes something that is dangerous and has the capacity to cause harm. In this context the water 
management device is perceived as something that causes untold misery by restricting water supply. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation and discussion of case study findings: Are rights 
denied through technology? 
 
4.1 Introduction: Participation – consensus or coercion? 
The discussion of the research results that follows is in two parts. The first part, in this 
chapter, discusses the nature of households’ participation in the project using Arnstein’s 
ladder of participation. Participation is a concept that empowers citizens to make informed 
decisions based on their perception of the installation of WMDs on their properties. 
Understanding the characteristics of the households is important in determining whether these 
were influential in the households’ response to the installation of WMDs. The second part of 
the discussion of the research results, which follows in chapter 5, discusses the impact of 
WMDs on households and how this has shaped their attitude towards water conservation.  
 
The democratic election of a new government in 1994 ushered in a representative democratic 
system in which other forms of public participation complemented the power of elected 
politicians. Participation in both national and provincial spheres of government takes the form 
of public involvement in the legislative processes. Subsection 152(1)(a)(e) of the Constitution 
gives Local Government the mandate ‘to provide democratic and accountable government to 
local communities’, as well as to ‘encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the matters of local government’ (RSA Constitution 1996). 
 
Fakir (2004) comments that it is local government’s responsibility to ensure democratic 
participation through the elected councillors and appointed municipal officials. Ideally, this 
process ensures the full participation of communities in issues that affect their lives, besides 
the cyclical five-year process of electing office holders. At the local level, councillors are the 
direct route for the public to access government and are often the first port of call for advice 
and support. They therefore play a pivotal role in ensuring public participation, especially in 
decisions that affect the communities they represent.  
 
4.2 Characteristics of households  
Saxonsea consists of a mixture of RDP and middle-income houses. The size of households in 
the study sample ranged from four to 15 people per household. In the study sample, 65% of 
households were female headed, who in a patriarchal setting take charge of ‘routine’ 
household chores such as fetching water, cooking and general upkeep of the family. 
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Following the installation of the WMDs, most households indicated that they had resorted to 
prioritising water usage for basic activities such as cooking, bathing, and laundry. In 
households with small children, adults shared their bath water and then recycled it for 
ablution purposes.  
 
4.2.1 Education  
There is a strong possibility that lack of education makes it difficult for some respondents to 
understand their water bills. Most respondents, when asked about their bills, could see the 
amount owing but could not understand how that amount had been arrived at. Nor could they 
understand how much water they had used, even as reflected on their bills. They dismissed 
their bills as complex and found it difficult to understand how the bills reflected their water 
use.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Level of education of head of household 
 
 
I am uneducated. I never went to school and there is no way 
that I can understand what this council bill means, it’s 
meaningless to me (Granny Susan, interview 2011). 
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4.2.2 Employment status of research sample 
The greater Atlantis is characterized by severe social and economic conditions, manifested by 
poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. According to Census 2001 statistics,
 22
 Ward 29
23’s 
economically active age population ranged between 15 and 65 years and of these, 70.59% 
were employed and 29.5% were unemployed.
24
 The employment status of heads of 
households revealed that 65% were unemployed and 35% were employed. This high rate of 
unemployment is, according to the 2001 Census report, reflective of the depressed economic 
activity in the area.  
 
Figure 4: Employment status of heads of households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
22 The Census is carried out in a ten-year cycle.  
23 War 29 includes Avondale SP1, Beaconhill, Protea Park, Robinvale, Saxonsea, Sherwood, Wesfleur, and 
Witsand (see Figure 5 map) 
24 An unemployed person is defined in the Census as one who has no job, either permanently or temporarily, but 
in some cases is actively looking for employment and could work if they got a job (Census 2001). 
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Figure 5: Ward 29 
 
Source: Google Maps (2014) 
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Atlantis,+Cape+Town,+South+Africa/ 
 
4.2.3 Level of income 
The response to this is reflected in part through the provision of the Indigent Grant (discussed 
extensively elsewhere in the report). One can also tie income to education, which make an 
impact on households in terms of opportunities for better paying employment.  Hence in some 
instances respondents said they were prepared to change their behaviour to conform to the 
new water access regime.  
 
For households without income, the installation of WMDs ensures that they can enjoy their 
constitutional right to access to water. In that light, the City ensures that its residents have 
access to basic water and sanitation services irrespective of their economic status. It also 
ensures efficiency in water provision and curbs unaccounted for water (UAW) through leak 
repairs and subsequent installation of the WMDs.  
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Figure 6: Level of household income and high rate of WMD acceptance  
 
 
A quick look at some of the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents (level of 
unemployment, income and education levels), paints a picture that is consistent with 
depressed economic activity and would arguably influence how most households would 
respond to incentives to accept WMDs. The majority of respondents indicated that they were 
worried about their unpaid bills and would settle their bills if they had disposable income.  
 
4.3 Ladder of participation  
Arnstein’s ladder of participation was used to look closely at different types of participation 
and more importantly to see the lens through which both parties view participation, and at 
what point this translates to coercion especially in relation to poor households. Earlier in the 
report, I discussed other forms of participation as guaranteed by the Constitution to ensure 
that citizens take an active and meaningful role in democratic processes. This marks a 
departure from the previous exclusive state of the apartheid era to the inclusive democratic 
state that is ‘responsive’ to the needs of the majority.  
 
The form of public participation in Saxonsea took the form of administrators deciding what 
they thought was suitable for the area and then ‘consulting’ residents to approve their 
decision. While Kavinya, et al (1994) advocate for community involvement in decision-
making processes that affect their lives, the coercive strategy employed by Community 
Service Agents (CSAs) on behalf of the City was different from what Freire and others 
advocated would be effective. 
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Sokupa’s views on the ward councillors’ lack of decision-making capacity was confirmed 
when the Saxonsea ward councillor indicated in an interview that, although she was 
personally not in favour of the implementation of the WMDs in the community, her political 
role as an elected member ‘forced’ her to comply. As ward councillor, she had no capacity to 
object to this project even though in her personal capacity she believed that it infringed on the 
rights of the residents of Saxonsea.  
 
I am an elected official and must promote Council’s projects such as this one even 
though I have my personal reservations against it. It is so painful to see people 
struggling but one has to understand also what drives the Council to implement such 
drastic measures (Ward Councillor Rass, interview, 5 November 2011). 
 
In terms of public participation in processes that affected their access to water, 72% of the 
respondents said they did not know whether the City had called for any meetings with the 
residents to discuss the new water access restrictions and interventions. Only 11% said the 
City did hold meetings, while 17% said none were held. This lack of awareness bodes ill for 
the City’s interaction with the residents and it is an indication of poor communication 
between the two parties. This lack of awareness can also be interpreted as apathy by residents 
towards the City’s programmes. 
 
Figure 7: Meetings held with residents before the installation of WMDs? 
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Anstein’s ladder of participation offers valuable guidelines with which to understand citizens’ 
participation in Saxonsea, especially whether households and various stakeholders 
participated meaningfully in the project.  According to the results from the respondents, the 
level of participation is at the lower rungs of the participation ladder, manipulation and 
therapy.  Households were not given room as participants to make meaningful contributions.  
 
The buy-in process for the acceptance of the WMDs cannot be seen as participation because 
nowhere in the process were households as water consumers given the chance to contribute to 
decisions that affected their lives, except at the implementation stage of the project. Even at 
that stage, households merely rubber-stamped the process because decisions had already been 
made regarding the cost recovery process through the installation of the devices.
25
 The mere 
courtesy of ‘education and awareness’ about the importance of water is not participation 
insofar as making meaningful contribution is concerned. It is important to remember that right 
from the beginning, the City had already decided on a course of action given the rate of high-
unpaid bills and the need to recover costs as well control unaccounted for water loss. The 
decision to implement the WMDs was part of a water demand strategy that had nothing to do 
with the wilful participation of water consumers. That the project took place against a 
backdrop of high levels of unpaid bills and unaccounted for water loss gave the City 
credibility to target lower-income groups and ensure they only use as much water as they can 
afford, without adding to the City’s financial obligations. The objectives of the leaks repair 
and WMD installation project in Saxonsea were:  
 
 to ensure that 95% of properties consumed not more than 11kilo litre/ month;  
 to reduce unaccounted for water loss; and  
 to ensure that 99% using of those more than 11kilo litre/month pay their water and 
sewerage bills through the installation of WMDs (City of Cape Town report 2001).  
 
4.4  Community coercion or active participation? 
As part of the tender process, the consultants had to make sure that they employed ‘trained’ 
CSAs and ‘restricted’ plumbers to carry out the education, awareness and leaks detection and 
repair process. Both CSAs and restricted plumbers were part of the community and were 
                                                        
25 See Table 6 guidelines for the door–to-door activities of CSAs and plumbers. 
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selected as part of an empowering process that sought to build skills from within the 
community. Notably, the consultants were not resident in the community and therefore relied 
on the local ‘employees’ to garner goodwill and support from their community. 
 
The activities of CSAs and restricted plumbers reflect a typical top-down approach, which 
does not even pretend to accommodate any dissenting voice. The nature of participation was 
only in so far as the households complied with the instructions as relayed by the CSAs, whose 
understanding of the project was guided by the limited training they had before the onset of 
the project, therefore the table acted as a reference point to guide the installation process.  
 
The table below shows the skewed nature of participation and consultation before and after 
the implementation of the WMDs. The above information was used for both Saxonsea and 
Samora Machel WMDs installation projects. 
 
Table 5: The CSAs and plumbers door-to-door activities  
Table 5: Door-to-door activities of CSAs and plumbers 
 Process CSAs Plumbers 
1 Visit No. 1 1. Greet the owner. 
2. Check the name of the owner against the 
Council record and note differences if any. 
3. Hand-over the Flow Limiter/Water 
Management Device pamphlet. 
4. Educate the owner on the issues in the 
pamphlet and those in the A4 bookilo litreet 
especially those listed in table 3. 
5. Inform owner of what leaks will not be 
repaired under the project. 
6. If owner or designated senior member is not at 
home (NAH), leave bookilo litreet and calling 
card with date of 2
nd
 visit. 
1. Install the 
flow limiter 
and set on 
free flow 
(whether or 
not the 
owner is 
there). 
2. Take a meter 
reading. 
 
2 Visit No. 2 
(at least 30 
days after 
1. If previously NAH cover issues under Visit 1. 
2. Greet the owner. 
3. Show the owner where there are leaks and 
1. Take a meter 
reading. 
2. Download 
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Table 5: Door-to-door activities of CSAs and plumbers 
 Process CSAs Plumbers 
visit no. 1. 
Team 
installing 
flow limiter 
will go 
ahead of 
plumbing 
repair team) 
what needs to be repaired. 
4. If no leaks but high consumption, identify 
water uses and advise on how to reduce 
consumption. This is critical as the owner will 
experience problems once the Flow Limiter is 
installed. 
5. Ask the owner for the latest bill and identify 
properties that have incorrect billing 
information e.g. no Indigent Grant. 
6. Inform owner of date that plumber will repair 
water leaks. 
7. Ask the owner to sign off the audit and the 
visit 
8. Ask owner to sign agreement letter. If owner 
refuses, inform him/her that no repairs will be 
done and the standard credit control process 
will be followed. 
9. If owner or designated senior member is not at 
home (NAH), leave bookilo litreet and calling 
card to contact the contractor to arrange date to 
visit. 
consumption 
information 
from Flow 
Limiter for 
the period. 
3. Audit the 
plumbing. 
3 Visit No. 3 1. If previous NAH, undertake activities as per 
Visit No 1.1 
2. Inform owner how to maintain plumbing in 
good condition 
3. Sign off plumbing repair 
4. Repeat information about flow limiter – 
ensure owner understands (report unhappy 
owners for special visit). 
5. If owner or designated senior member is not at 
home (NAH) leave calling card giving date of 
1. Take a meter 
reading 
2. Repair the 
plumbing. 
3. Ensure no 
leaks. 
4. Set flow 
limiter 
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Table 5: Door-to-door activities of CSAs and plumbers 
 Process CSAs Plumbers 
installation of the Flow Limiter. Leave a 
leaflet explaining who the owner should 
contact if they run out of water during the day. 
6. Install “Hlonipha Amanzi” Boards. 
7. Handover the A4 bookilo litreet and A4 
colouring book 
8. Educate the owner on the issues in the A4 
bookilo litreet. 
4 Visit No. 4 This occurs about 6 weeks after the flow limiter 
is commissioned at the property. 
 
1. Check for understanding 
2. Ensure no problems with leaks or with WMD 
3. CSA calls plumber if it is a technical problem 
with WMD or a new water leak 
4. Follow up on those whose flow limiter is set 
>10.62Kilo litre/month and have not paid 
On call out from 
CSA: 
 
1. Audit new 
leaks. 
2. Repair new 
leaks. 
3. Repair/adjust 
WMD. 
5 Call out 
from 
Customer 
This visit is only in response to customer call out 
 
1. CSA goes to investigate first to check that the 
problem is not to do with customer 
understanding. 
2. Educate customer in case of understanding 
problem. 
3. CSA calls plumber if it is a technical problem 
with WMD or a new water leak 
On call out from 
CSA: 
 
1. Audit new 
leaks. 
2. Repair new 
leaks. 
3. Repair/adjust 
WMD. 
Source: City of Cape Town Scope of Work Q2009/10 (2009:12) 
4.5 Impact of Water Demand Management on households 
The City’s integrated water leaks repair project aimed at reducing unaccounted for water loss 
through the repair of leaks within the residential properties, to ensure that indigent households 
used their allocated water. The City sought to change consumer behaviour and this had the 
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effect of individualizing the navigation of access to water through technological intervention, 
and in the process, removing the human interface.  
 
Access to water becomes an isolating experience, which forces the consumer to drastically 
change their attitude towards water use and adopt a calculative approach to it. In addition, 
residents are encouraged to regularly check and report water leaks to authorities. This process 
transfers the responsibility of water management from the water provider to the end user. As 
mentioned elsewhere in this report, indigent households are entitled to the free life line of 
6kilo litre and additional 4.2kilo litre for basic sewerage discharge for a household size of 
eight members, without double occupation or any water consuming businesses on their 
properties. Unlike in the Cape Flats’ Samora Machel settlement, where backyard dwellers 
have access to their own water supply through individual access tags, in Saxonsea the daily 
allocation does not cater for extra households on the same property. Although backyard 
dwellers were not a significant feature in the research sample, the few properties that had 
extra households shared their allocated daily supply.  
 
In Umlazi, EThekwini Municipality, residents have logbooks where they record the daily 
amount of water dispensed in order to identify any technical problems with their flow limiters 
(Thompson, et al (2013 WRC Report). This approach to water demand management is based 
on the premise that water is a precious, scarce and strategic resource not be wasted and has to 
be accounted for at all times.  
 
4.6 Consultation or command installation of WMDs 
The period within which the project had to be completed could not realistically accommodate 
an adequate consultative process. The project started on 1 December 2007 and ran until 1 
August 2008 and had to be completed before the end of the financial year (City of Cape Town 
2009). By the time that the devices were installed in Saxonsea, a consultative process should 
have taken place whereby the residents would have been informed about the project and their 
opinions solicited about the water situation and debt levels, but this was not done. Both the 
Ward Councillor and a Council official confirmed in separate interviews that the consultative 
process did not take place. 
 
While 56% of the respondents said that no consultation happened before the installation of the 
devices, the other 44% said the only consultation that took place was when the ‘restricted 
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plumbers’26 and CSAs came to install the WMDs. The respondents claimed that they were 
told that it was compulsory for every household to have the devices installed and that those 
who refused would face the consequence, namely, having to pay off their arrears or risk 
disconnection. It appears that threats of unspecified action persuaded some households to 
accept the WMDs. These threats are outlined in Table 5 above, which provides guidelines for 
CSAs to inform the household owners/respondents of the consequences that would 
accompany refusal to participate in the device installation project: 
 
If owner refuses, inform him/her that no repairs will be done and the standard credit 
control process will be followed (City of Cape Town 2009, Door–to-Door Activities 
of CSAs and Plumbers guideline) 
 
While the use of consultants by the City could be seen as a way to bridge the skills gap and 
manpower shortage, there should be a way to assess their performance on the ground so as to 
avoid the misinformation and use of intimidation tactics in order to enforce compliance. The 
danger of using untrained CSAs, as in the case cited above, is that they lack the technical 
skills and expertise of how the City functions and therefore resort to intimidation tactics to 
mask their inadequacy and lack of understanding. This brings about the challenge of quality 
of information and the ripple effect this has on the relationship between the City and the 
affected households. 
 
Similarly, a study by the Environmental Monitoring Group (2009) also revealed that 
households in Witsand near Saxonsea, also complained about lack of consultation by the City 
regarding water issues. The City implemented WMDs without prior consultation and this 
angered residents who felt discriminated against and disempowered because of their 
disadvantaged economic status.  
 
4.7 Type of information given on WMDs 
In response to the question on the type of information given during the device installation, 
57% of the respondents said they did not know anything about the information given, while 
37% said it was neither good nor bad. Only 6% said the information given about the devices 
                                                        
26 These are ‘plumbers’ trained on the job by the plumbing team that won the bid to install WMDs in Atlantis. 
They have no formal training in plumbing and have been ‘trained’ as part of the job creation initiative so that 
they would be able to attend to minor problems that arise after the completion of the project, in their own 
capacities as ‘plumbers’.   
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was very useful. On further probing, those who said the information was good based it on the 
fact that they would not have to pay for any water if they accepted the installation of the 
devices.  
From the responses given, it would appear that the financial aspect of accepting the 
installation of the devices was the major selling point, understandably because of the inability 
of the majority of households to pay their bills. It would appear that the information given by 
CSAs highlighted the financial advantages associated with the device rather than their overall 
impact on the scarcity of water in the City. One respondent indicated that she felt intimidated 
because the CSAs told her that it was compulsory for all households to install the devices, and 
therefore had no choice but to accept it. In an interview with the City’s technical project 
manager in charge of the installations, it transpired that towards the end of the project, the 
CSAs allegedly sabotaged the installation programme by misinforming both the City and the 
residents; throwing away documents signed by home owners; and claiming that home owners 
were not home for the installation of WMDs in a bid to stretch their contractual period. The 
CSAs allegedly turned against the City and criticized the project for targeting only the poor, 
thus fuelling suspicion and uncertainty. This highlights the danger of outsourcing, as people 
lack loyalty to the project and concentrate on their financial gains at the expense of the overall 
project and its potential gains. 
 
I was told that the new water management device was compulsory, otherwise had I 
been told the whole truth, I would have opted to keep my old conventional meter 
because it never gave me problems. This new meter has been replaced three times 
whereas the old meter had been there for 24 years without any problems at all (Mrs 
Greenwald, interview, 6 November 2011).  
 
These were sentiments expressed by a respondent who felt that she was not given adequate 
information regarding the WMDs and that she had not made an informed decision.  
 
However, given that the City’s plan was to install the devices, it is debatable whether her 
refusal would have made any difference, especially given that her account was already in 
arrears. The households interpreted the use of ill-informed CSAs as reflection that the City 
did not consider them important enough to give them useful information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  79 
4.8 Extent of citizens’ power in relation to perception of WMDs  
The democratic election of a new government in 1994 ushered in a representative democratic 
system in which other forms of public participation complemented the power of elected 
politicians. Participation in both national and provincial spheres of government takes the form 
of public involvement in the legislative processes. 
 
Subsection 152(1)(a)(e) of the Constitution gives Local Government the mandate ‘to provide 
democratic and accountable government to local communities’, as well as to ‘encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local 
government’ (RSA Constitution 1996). Fakir (2004) explains that it is local government’s 
responsibility to ensure democratic participation through the elected councillors and 
appointed municipal officials. Ideally, this process ensures the full participation of 
communities in issues that affect their lives, besides the cyclical five-year process of electing 
office holders. At the local level, councillors are the direct route for the public to access 
government and are often the first port of call for advice and support. They therefore play a 
pivotal role in ensuring public participation, especially in decisions that affect the 
communities they represent.  
 
Battersby-Lennard (2009) argues that the effects of apartheid’s continue to impact on the day-
to-day lives of people long after its official demise. Piper & von Lieres (2008) explain that the 
emergence of the term ‘citizenship’ was a result of the early political context, which saw a 
particular configuration of both the state and civil society coupled with their mutual 
relationship. Various rights are embedded in citizenship, especially the political right to vote, 
which then brought together various political actors and helped them find their place within 
the new democratic dispensation.  
Given the fluid nature of debates on citizenship, 42% of respondents understood it in terms of 
their acceptance of the installation of the WMDs, while 58% said citizens’ power was very 
low because they felt compelled to accept the devices. Some respondents said they felt 
unfairly targeted and discriminated against because of their socio-economic status. The threat 
about their debt status was another factor that encouraged some households to accept the 
devices.  
“To me free water means that I will not be worrying about paying bills, but when my 
supply gets cuts for three days on end, what is the point? These people take their time 
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to come and reconnect our water supply, this is very unhealthy and I fear for my 
children that they will contract diseases” (Mr Johnson, interview, 6 November 2011). 
 
4.9 Infringement of people’s rights over sanitary functions  
Based on the disconfirmation theory of consumer satisfaction, if the product’s performance 
does not meet prior expectations, it leads to dissatisfaction. On the other hand, confirmation 
takes place when a product’s performance equals prior expectations. The experience of erratic 
water supply contravenes the basic tenets of the Strategic Framework for Water Services 
(RSA, 2003) whose notion of ‘basic water supply service’ says it must not be interrupted for 
more than 48 consecutive hours per incident.  
 
Box 1. When the promised new water management fails to live up to expectations  
Granny Masilela (not her real name) and her husband live in a four-roomed RDP house in 
Lapland, a poorer section of Saxonsea. They have two children: a married son, who lives with 
his pregnant wife and their two young children in a two-roomed backyard dwelling behind the 
main house, and an unmarried daughter who lives elsewhere with her lover, but whose two-
school going children live at this house with their grandparents. Their water supply is erratic 
and sometimes they go for three days without water and rely on their neighbours for cooking 
and drinking water. There are no public toilet facilities close by so the family uses the indoor 
toilet. When there is no water to flush it, this renders the house inhabitable because of the 
stench. Their water bills reflect an average daily amount of 193 litres, way below the 350 
litres per day per household of eight people. An enquiry at the housing office brought 
confirmation from a council official that the WMD was faulty and it was logged for 
replacement. A week later, I visited granny Masilela’s house and she indicated that her WMD 
had been replaced and their water supply restored. This time there was no stench and 
everyone looked happy. She indicated that her neighbour’s water supply was cut and she was 
now returning the favour and giving the neighbour water for her basic needs. 
 
4.10 Level of satisfaction with water services 
In Saxonsea 50% of the respondents said they were satisfied with water services from the 
City. On the other hand, 12% respondents expressed dissatisfaction, while a further 38% were 
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the services. Those who were dissatisfied noted that this 
was mainly due to frequent breakdowns of the water devices, lack of adequate after-hours 
service from the local depot and suspicion that the devices were some form of punishment for 
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non-payment of bills. The respondents were aware of the need to pay their bills but said they 
had no financial means; neither did they have clear prospects of getting meaningful 
employment that would enable them to pay their bills in the future. What came through 
clearly was that they were not boycotting their responsibility to pay, but that there were very 
few employment opportunities within the Atlantis community to support their needs. 
 
Statistics of current operational industries in the area confirm this observation. While the 
industrial boom that had been envisaged in the 1980s by the then apartheid government failed 
to hold, it threw all plans for a self-sustaining Atlantis into disarray, hence the historical 
impact of unemployment continues to play out in the current economic climate.  
 
Unlike the rental boycott that beset places such as Soweto during the apartheid era, Atlantis is 
different. Atlantis was a failed project by the regime that sought to further disenfranchise its 
people by separating them, with the intention of creating enclaves for Coloured people. The 
other differentiating factor was that in Atlantis, the regime sought to attract industries to 
create employment for the majority of the people there, yet the same provisions were not 
made for the people in Soweto. 
 
It is notable that the responses of those who were satisfied with water services were 
financially induced, because they would not have to worry about payment of water bills as the 
City had promised to write off their arrears, which some of them indicated that they had failed 
to service due to lack of income. 
 
Sharing bath water with family members came through as a prevalent practice and a large 
majority gave up gardening in a bid to save water, a situation that saddened many of the 
respondents. Some respondents indicated that although they were saddened not to pursue 
gardening, which kept them active and happy, it was a small price to pay in exchange for a 
debt-free life. It is not surprising that most households that recorded high-unpaid bills 
expressed satisfaction with the services delivered by the City. As one respondent observed: 
 
“As long as I do not pay for water I will make a plan to ensure that water is used 
wisely. Since I have no income this free water has come as a big relief, especially 
because my debt will be cancelled” (Mr Kilo litreeinsmith, questionnaire, 6 November 
2011).  
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Another respondent complained that although she does not have to pay for water, it comes 
with nasty consequences for her family: 
 
“My house smells like a sewer and I don’t enjoy living like this, it’s inhuman and 
undignified to live in such conditions, ndiphila njenge nyamazana (I live like a wild 
animal).
27
 I fear for my grandchildren that they will fall sick because of not having 
water. What will happen if my neighbour refuses to give me her water”? (Mrs 
Masilela, interview, 8 November 2011)  
Her neighbour gives her two buckets of water: enough for cooking, drinking and washing 
dishes. The stench of human waste was unbearable and was worsened by high temperatures. 
Her description of her living condition was not an exaggeration; it was simply unthinkable 
how anyone could live under such circumstances.  
 
Figure 8: Tap bucket  
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, (2011) 
According to the calibration on the bucket above, it holds 35 litres, but in reality it is a 20 -
litre bucket. This bucket has a tap that ensures that no water is lost unnecessarily. In any case, 
                                                        
27 Because of frequent water cuts and malfunctioning water management device, she likened her living 
conditions to that of wild animals. 
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ten of these 35 litre buckets are the equivalent of what a family of eight people is allocated 
daily and therefore acts a constant reminder that water should be used carefully. On the other 
hand, the table below illustrate the double standards approach to water provision by the City 
to its residents. Low-income households receive an allocation of 44 litres per person per day. 
This means that every aspect of life that requires the use of water is highly regulated and 
bodily functions like ablutions and personal hygiene are carefully thought out to ensure that 
there is adequate water throughout the day.  
 
Table 6: Water use patterns in a home: Average daily use for a typical dwelling with four 
occupants (excluding garden use) 
 
Place  Family not saving water Family saving water 
Bath  2 x 150 mm deep 180 l each 2 x 100 mm deep 90 I each 
Shower  2 showers 12 l /min 
60 l per 5 min each 
2 showers 6 l /min 
24 l per 4 min each (close tap while 
soaping) 
Basin  Water used freely 30 l Water used carefully 20 l 
Toilet  6 flushes per person per day  
9 l cistern 216 l 
4 flushes per person per day with 
hippo fitted 9 l cistern 112 l 
Washing machine 5 x per week x 110 l = 550 l 4 x per week x 110 l = 440 l 
Hand washing Clothing, floors, windows & 
other 20 l 
Used sparingly & other 15 l 
Cooking and 
drinking 
15 l 15 l 
Dishwashing  Sink filled with water each time 
40 l 
Used sparingly each time 30 l 
Total  939 litres 530 litres 
 Equals 235 l per person per day Equals 132 l per person per day 
 
Source: City of Cape Town (2006 
http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/Water/Documents/account_Eng.pdf) 
 
The table six above shows a comparison of use patterns for two sets of families of four in 
2006. In the low-income areas such as Saxonsea (Atlantis) and Samora Machel (Cape Flats) 
each individual has an allocation of 44 litres per day, three times less than the 132 litres per 
person shown in the table above.  
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The City has applauded the success of the integrated water leaks and repair project in terms of 
the amount of water and money saved since the beginning of the project, which has since 
been replicated in other low-income areas such as Samora Machel. In Saxonsea, the City 
recorded huge water savings per household following the installation of WMDs, as shown in 
the table below.  
 
 
Table 7: Household consumption before and after device installation (450l/ day setting) 
Indicator Amount 
Average water consumption before project 41.00 kilo 
litre/month 
Average water consumption after project 12.58 kilo 
litre/month 
Average monthly water saving 28.42 kilo 
litre/month 
Total monthly cost saving  R200,929 
PV of savings over 20 years R48.6 million 
Payback period of total project 28 months 
 
Source: City of Cape Town project report (2009:16) 
 
In both instances, it is the poor communities that have had these water saving interventions 
implemented. While the City is within its right to applaud water saving by poor communities, 
what remains unknown is to what extent this saving has impacted on the dignity and 
wellbeing of the participating households. This thesis argues that turning service delivery into 
welfare benefits in the form of the indigent grant and then further regulating that water service 
is a double blow to the poor. In the case of Cape Town, as argued elsewhere in this report, all 
households receive the FBW supply of 6kilo litre irrespective of their ability to pay, with the 
only difference that the poor then get regulated on the free water, while those who can afford 
to pay for additional water, do so. 
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4.11 Awareness of the Indigent Grant  
Although designed to assist the poor, results of the survey and in-depth interviews in 
Saxonsea showed that 86% of the respondents had never heard about the Indigent Grant and 
although only 14% were aware of it, they did not know how to access it.  
 
Asked whether they would apply for the grant, the majority of respondents said they would a 
few said they would not because of fear of stigmatisation. Respondents expressed reluctance 
to take part in a process that they did not understand unless they got assistance from City 
officials. Smith (2009) argues that the indigent application process is both demanding and 
humiliating for affected households. Ironically, 100% of the interviewed households are 
classified as automatic indigents, and therefore beneficiaries of the grant. Given that 
automatic indigents qualify on the basis of their property and land value, this could be reason 
why the interviewees were not aware of the existence of the grant. Automatic indigents are 
identified through a computerised system and need not physically apply for the grant (Smith 
2010, City 2008).  
 
Figure 9: Awareness of Indigent Grant 
 
 
 
As automatic indigents, households enjoy free refuse removal and get an extra R40 worth of 
free water and sanitation services, of which they are not aware. Some respondents were 
surprised to find out that they were automatic beneficiaries of the grant but indicated that if 
they had a choice, they would prefer a cash hand-out for other household needs. A large 
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number of respondents did not know how to read their bills from the City: all they dealt with 
was the amount owing, without understanding the breakdown shown in the bill, which 
explained why so many of them could not see that their bills reflected their indigent status.  
 
While that could easily be ignored, it is an indication of a gap in communication between the 
City and households. The Ward Councillor (who at the time of the study had been in office 
for just over four months) confirmed this lack of communication and lamented the lack of 
awareness by the Atlantis community of how to access the various services offered by the 
City. She added that part of her responsibility was to bring the City to the people and ensure 
that they attained a fair understanding of how the two parties (residents and the City) could 
enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship. The Councillor indicated that she was once a 
member of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and later ‘crossed the floor’ (my 
emphasis) and joined the Democratic Alliance (DA). 
 
4.12 Debt write-off 
Part of the incentive for WMDs was debt write-off, especially for households that had 
incurred huge bills. While 23.04% of the respondents said their debt was written off, 26.52% 
said it had not been written off and 49.57% did not know. None of the respondents whose 
arrears had not been written off indicated any intention to seek answers from the City; instead 
there was an air of despondency about the whole issue. Some respondents said the City just 
did not care about them because they are poor and unemployed. One added that the City only 
cared about rich people with large swimming pools. The negative perception that some 
households expressed about the City could arguably be the reason why they are not aware of 
programmes that benefit them, such as the indigent grant. 
 
Several issues emerged in an informal interview with one of the council officials at the 
Wesfleur housing office. First, although the City had promised to write off arrears six months 
after installation of the WMDs, only a few households had had their arrears written off 
because of a huge backilo litreog, confirming the responses of 23.04% of respondents. 
However, this backilo litreog information was never communicated to households because 
doing so would have revealed that the City had not fulfilled its promises, thus confirming the 
suspicion with which some of the residents view it. 
 
 
 
 
 
  87 
Second, the official added that some residents had threatened council officials with 
unspecified action when they experienced water cuts, thereby forcing them to be put on free 
flow which in turn resulted in them incurring high bills. The official said the council workers 
felt intimidated as they live in the same community.  
 
A common complaint by some respondents was that council officials took their time to 
respond to calls about water cuts; some respondents had spent a whole weekend without any 
water supply. One respondent even said that council officials told her that the people who 
fixed the WMDs would come from Durban and would therefore take a while to fix her meter.  
 
4.13 Withholding information to protect the poor from themselves  
In an interview with the Council official, it emerged that information about applying for 
additional water above the regulated amount was withheld from the residents to avoid being 
inundated with more requests. According to the official, the idea was to let households adjust 
to the new water regime and ‘learn to live within their means’.  
 
Figure 10: Level of awareness that you can apply for more water if you have a function 
 
 
This tied in with the result from the survey that showed 81% of the households interviewed 
were not aware that they could apply for additional water should the need arise. Only 19% of 
respondents were aware that they could apply for an additional water allocation, and that they 
had to pay for it.  
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On whether it was not the City’s responsibility to give adequate information to residents, the 
official defended the withholding of information as advantageous to the households to avoid 
incurring bills they could not afford to pay. Therefore lack of information could be attributed 
to lack of awareness about the option of applying for additional water, should the need arise. 
However, in her personal capacity, the same official expressed sympathy for challenges 
experienced by households on a day-to-day basis and admitted that she would never be able to 
function within those restrictive limits.  
 
“I feel sorry for the households that have to live with this device, because they have no 
choice because of their circumstances. I certainly cannot imagine myself living with 
this kind of restriction”. (Personal interview with council official Ms September, 6 
November 2011) 
 
Perhaps more revealing was that the official was aware that some of her colleagues, especially 
at the Depot office, were not putting much effort into helping the residents and simply 
watched helplessly as the situation worsened. She revealed that when complaints about water 
cuts reached her office, she escalated them to the Depot officials, whose response time was 
too long. She let slip that the Depot office was experiencing staffing problems, low moral and 
was often overwhelmed by requests. As a result, they sometimes put some households on 
free-flow to avoid going out to sort out problems with water cuts. Apparently some 
households once threatened council officials with unspecified action if water supply was not 
restored on free flow. 
 
4.14 City’s perception of impact of WMDs on water consumption 
The interview with the Ward Councillor was very informative because she was critical of the 
WMDs and said that these infringed on the rights of the people. However, she added that as 
part of the official voice, she had to support the project.  
It is very distressing to see people suffering as a result of these devices, but I have to 
stand here and support the official decision. Personally I will never have this device on 
my property (Ms September, interview, 6 November 2011).  
 
The responses from both the council official and the Ward Councillor illustrate the 
contradiction between the official and personal lines regarding the water management strategy 
employed by the City. Both officials were adamant that they would never have the WMDs on 
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their properties because of their restrictive nature and because of the infringement of their 
rights to access water. Yet as City employees they were part of the implementation process. 
4.15 Conclusion 
In conclusion, using a combination of questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews proved 
to be a useful approach as it enabled the researcher to uncover important facts behind the 
responses elicited in the questionnaire survey, which would otherwise remained untouched.  
 
Although the majority of interviewees indicated that they were satisfied with the WMDs, this 
was insofar as it translated to no payment of bills, yet on the other hand, they felt 
discriminated against because of lack of consultation and their economic status. For example, 
the high level of satisfaction with the WMDs was directly related to financial relief and not 
because of the perceived need to preserve water. Lack of consultation was another issue that 
left interviewees unhappy as well as the fact that it was deemed compulsory for every 
household to accept the WMD. 
 
The deliberate withholding of information by the local council about applying for additional 
water as a strategy to protect the poor comes can be interpreted as violation of people’s rights. 
It comes across as patronizing and given the lack of awareness about the water management 
project by the majority of the interviewees, it lends itself to speculation about what else is 
withheld to ‘protect’ the poor. It is quite disturbing that a large number of respondents lacked 
information about their water use, were unable to read and understand their bills and never 
knew about their indigent benefits, yet stood to benefit from the programmes and services 
offered by the City. Massive education and awareness programmes should be put in place. 
Ward Councillor Rass said she was alarmed by the lack of knowledge of basic things by 
people in her Ward and was embarking on an awareness programme to help the people 
understand and know how to access the services offered by the City. 
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Chapter 5 Perspectives on water management devices 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 discussed the issue of participation of households in the implementation of the 
WMDs project, the extent of citizen participation and how this shaped their attitudes towards 
the new water access regime.  
 
Chapter 5 continues to look at the impact of WMDs on households and how this has forced 
them to adjust their water consumption in line with the new system. This is all part of the cost 
recovery process that seeks to ensure that poor households use water within their means and 
as mentioned in the previous chapter, places the responsibility of access to water to individual 
consumers and keeps them preoccupied with complying with the new requirements. In a way, 
this has had an effect of shifting focus from the communal or social mobilization response to 
water cuts to an individualized process where the consumers deal with the municipal demands 
on their own, and have to modify their behaviour to suit the new way of accessing and using 
water. 
 
The introduction of technological interventions in the management of water for the poor is 
symbolic of the distance between the water service providers and the end users. Restrictive 
technology is part of the credit control and debt-collection strategies used by the local 
authorities, particularly in economically depressed communities. To cater for different 
consumer needs, local authorities use a mix of metering strategies that include conventional 
meters, pre-paid meters, WMDs, trickilo litreers, and standpipes. 
 
The technological interventions, as Loftus (2005) observes, restrict people’s access to water. 
These interventions have more power over the people because they self-cut when the set daily 
limit has been finished leaving the consumers on the other side frustrated and unable to access 
water till the following day. 
5.2  Exploring the impact of WMDs on households  
5.2.1 Sanitation 
As result of the installation of WMDs, access to water has become a calculative affair and 
households prioritise water consumption for fear of running out. Unlike electricity, which is 
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replaceable, water is irreplaceable and therefore becomes essential that proper planning be in 
place to meet the daily requirements. Based on the daily amount of 350 litres per household of 
eight members per day, each individual has an allocation of 43 litres, which must be carefully 
divided to meet the daily necessities such as bathing, cooking, drinking, laundry and ablution. 
A further analysis reveals that each individual not only has to control the amount of water 
they use, but also their bodily functions so that they can have adequate water to flush their 
waste. The politics of water leaves households in a space where they have to prioritise their 
water use and in the process guard each other against wasteful use. It is important to note that 
although the majority of households expressed satisfaction with WMDs, this was financially 
motivated and not out of a sudden realization of the importance to conserve water. The City’s 
draft report on the IWRM project shows that, prior to the implementation of WMDs in 
Saxonsea, the average monthly water consumption was 42kl and this dropped to 12lkl 
following their installation (City of Cape Town project report 2009). This massive reduction 
in water consumption per household resulted in huge financial and water savings for the City. 
 
5.2.2 Impact of water management device on households 
While one of the positive features of the device is leak detection, which allows for automatic 
meter reading (AMR) and would flash warning signs to the individual manning the machine 
remotely, the experience of one household was glaringly worrisome. Soon after the 
installation of the device in 2007, Mrs Jones* (not her real name) got a bill of R28 000 which 
forced her to seek clarification from the Council. The bill was later written off. Mrs Jones 
lives in an RDP house, like most people in her area, and has eight family members. Also like 
most households in the area, she had high arrears and was told that once she accepted the 
WMD, these would be written off. It seemed like a bittersweet pill, which she was prepared to 
swallow because her family was struggling to make ends meet. Her husband is the only 
breadwinner and all her six children are unemployed. The financial relief was welcome, 
although it meant that the family had to make drastic changes to ensure that they complied 
with the new water use requirements. First, she removed the conventional bathtub, and 
replaced it with a large plastic bath dish (in which an adult cannot sit, but has to stand during 
a bath; only a child can sit down comfortably). This holds less water than an average bathtub. 
The property is on a corner stand, and most of the ground where there was once lawn is under 
a concrete slab except for a strip of greenery at the gate. Mrs Jones said that gardening was no 
longer an option, as it required more water, which her family could ill-afford. She therefore 
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was astounded when she got a bill of R28 000 soon after the installation of the water 
management device on her property. 
 
“There was water all over this place outside and I am sure the plumbers that replaced 
the meter did a bad job because I never had such problems before with the other 
meter. Not even a factory can run a bill that high. Just look at my property and see 
where I can use that amount of water” (Mrs Jones, interview, 10 November 2011).  
 
Mrs Faber, a self-appointed social activist living in Lapland who has taken it upon herself to 
champion the cause of her fellow community members, further confirmed Mrs Jones’ 
statement and added that she had actively encouraged her to take the matter to the Council. 
The matter was subsequently resolved, but Mrs Jones’ current bills are high. Her current 
statement reflected a daily consumption rate of 1 800 litres, way above the average 450 litres 
other households receive. I asked whether she had gone back to the Council to complain about 
the high water bills, and she quipped: 
 
I no longer open my bills because I know they are ridiculously high. The last time I 
checked it was R5 984.22. When this device was installed I was told that it was set at 
450 litres and that I would not have to pay a cent for water, so I do not understand 
where these bills are coming from now. I have approached the Council several times 
but nothing happened. There is still water that I see around this blue meter and I think 
this is where the problem lies. We do laundry once a week and there are no small 
children here to misuse water (Mrs Jones, interview, 10 November 2011).  
 
The desperation that comes out of the consumer’s voice is reflective of the challenges faced 
by households in dealing with the device, which comes across as authoritarian and dictatorial. 
No negotiations are possible once the water is cut off, for whatever reason. The device 
dissocializes the water provision by replacing the human interaction. Utility Systems 
Corporation (USC), the manufacturers of the WMDs, describes it as a useful tool for 
‘management of water supply to domestic and commercial customers as well as managing 
delinquent customers (USC 2011 www.utility-systems.co.za) 
 
 
 
 
 
  93 
5.3 Impact of technical problems of WMDs  
Although 78% said they had not experienced major technical problems with the WMDs, 22% 
said they had experienced frequent breakdown of the device, which caused frustration 
because of the slow response rate by the municipal officials.  
 
Figure 11: Impact of the installation of WMDs on water usage 
 
 
 
 
Reasons given for technical problems were: 
1. Water would just cut off without using full capacity of our daily allocation.  
2. Water leaked on the council side and the meter was replaced. 
3. The meter just stopped working but when they changed it, it hasn’t given me 
problems again 
4. Faulty meter and frequent water cuts 
5. We do not have water sometimes for the whole day. Sometimes when we wake 
up there is no water. 
 
 
One respondent said that her WMD was replaced three times because it was not functioning 
properly and added that each time she reported the faulty device, the municipal office would 
take long before responding to her complaint, and in the meantime, she had to rely on her 
neighbours for water:  
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“Every time I reported the fault, I was told that the factory that manufactures these 
blue meters was closed during the weekend and opens on Monday. So you can 
imagine three days of begging for water from neighbours, it is humiliating, but we 
have no choice but to do it” (Mr January, interview, 10 November 2011). 
 
In response to a query about the complaint against municipal officials’ delay to fix the device, 
the Wesfleur Council official acknowledged that the local depot was plagued by staff 
shortages but hinted that there was a disconnect between the head office in Cape Town and 
the local office in Atlantis. Apparently the Wesfleur depot officials were not part of the 
planning team for the implementation of the WMD project and were only included towards 
the tail end of the process. As a result, they were not keen to fix the problems created by paid 
consultants. My informant added that the depot did not attend to any technical related 
problems after 11am, therefore leaving very little time to service the complaints and queries 
that came through their office. Although the public had no intimate details about the internal 
inefficiencies, the affected households believed that the City disregarded their plight because 
they were poor. Another respondent who also experienced technical problems with the WMD 
lamented the lack of support from the Water Department, adding that the officials ‘take their 
sweet time’ to respond, often leaving them desperate and helpless (Mrs Hoefmeyer, 
questionnaire, 5 November 2011). 
 
Another respondent observed that although local unemployed youths had been given an 
opportunity to learn new skills, these youths would not have been hired to do a similar job in 
well-to-do areas.  
 
5.4 Water cuts as access control measure 
Frequent water cuts featured prominently throughout the interviews as households 
complained that their daily water limits ran out by 10:00am, leaving them stranded, frustrated 
and angry. Probably the reason why households got frustrated with their WMDs was because 
it has no display console that shows how much water has been used, unlike the electricity 
prepaid meter that has a display console that shows the units available and therefore alerts the 
user to replenish the units. With the WMD system in Saxonsea, when the water supply is 
exhausted, it self-cuts without warning. This could be the reason why some respondents 
complained that their water supply gets cuts off in the morning because they did not 
understand how the system functioned. However, another version of the WMDs, with the in-
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house display console installed in the Cape Flats, does shows consumption levels and this 
enables the households to monitor their water usage. That way they are not caught unawares 
when their water allocation is exhausted. The device with the display console also compares 
better than the blue meter installed in Atlantis because it is easier to detect leaks within the 
system.  
 
Figure 12: In-house water management device display unit installed in Samora Machel  
 
 
Source: Ntwana, Fieldwork, 2013 
 
5.5 Comparison between conventional metres and WMDs 
In both the survey and in-depth interviews, respondents were asked to draw a comparison 
between the conventional water meter and the water management device. A behavioural and 
mind shift took place. It is important to note that this shift was not a result of the sudden 
realization of the importance to conserve water, but a purely economic decision. The other 
characteristic that endeared the new water meter to some households was that the hard plastic 
material it is made from has no economic value, compared with the metal conventional water 
metre that could be exchanged for cash at the metal scrap yards. Other respondents 
acknowledged that the new water regime forced them to calculate the amount of water they 
used for their daily needs and they therefore had to abandon gardening activities. The table 
below shows some of the responses: 
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Table 8:  Comparison between WMDs and conventional water meters 
 
Water management device Conventional water meter 
Water runs out early in the morning and we 
have to ask from neighbours 
Water never runs out at all. We used water 
freely without fear of being cut-off 
The blue meter never gets vandalized by 
thieves 
Thieves used to vandalise the meters to sell to 
scrap metal places 
Water is not guaranteed, we removed our 
lawns because there is not enough water for 
it. 
Water was guaranteed. We never worried 
about not having any, and we had lovely 
gardens, but now that is all history, not 
enough water to do everything 
No longer have to worry about paying water 
as it is free, it’s a small price to pay 
Having to worry about unpaid bills was not 
good 
Faulty meter, have had it replaced three times Never experienced technical problems with 
the old water meter 
The blue meter was supposed to control my 
bill but instead it has gone up, I think there is 
a leak somewhere 
I never knew how much water we used 
because it never ran out. 
My family now shares bath water and this is 
unhealthy, sometimes I do not bath at all 
Sharing bath water was never something that 
we did, but now all this has changed 
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Figure 13:  Comparison between WMDs and conventional water meter systems 
 
 
In response to the question on whether there was any difference between the conventional 
water meters and the WMDs, 50% of the respondents said they did not know the difference 
between the two types of meters. However, 4% indicated that WMDs (popularly called ‘blue 
meters’ because of their colour) were much worse than the conventional meters. With the 
conventional meters each household paid for its water at the end of the month, whereas the 
WMDs are set to dispense a daily pre-set amount of water. In this case, the WMDs were set to 
dispense 350 litres per day, which for some households was inadequate, as they had been used 
to unregulated quantities. Like conventional meters, WMDs can also be set on free flow, 
which resulted in high bills for some households. Some 13% of the respondents said WMDs 
were worse than conventional meters. One could argue further that if WMDs were better than 
the conventional meters, then a significantly high number of interviewees would have 
responded positively. In total 33% of the respondents said the WMDs were better than the 
conventional meters because they would not have to worry about paying bills. The only 
challenge was to readjust their usage pattern to fit the new dispensation.  
 
One respondent who experienced problems with her WMD expressed dissatisfaction with the 
device as well as the service from the Council offices: 
Since the installation of the blue meter, (WMD) I have experienced many problems. 
The meter rolls even when all the taps are closed, there surely is something wrong 
with it. I reported the matter to the Council offices and they kept promising that they 
 
 
 
 
  98 
would send someone to fix the problem. Now my water bill is higher than when I had 
the old meter. So, what is the point of having changed something that worked 
perfectly with something that is problematic? I really do not understand it. I do not 
have the energy to keep fighting; I am too old for this kind of thing. I am sick to my 
stomach over this water business and I am desperate for a permanent solution (Mrs 
Greenfield, interview, 7 November 2011). 
 
I asked this respondent to show me her water bills over a period of three months to check the 
usage pattern. During the first month her daily rate was 793 litres (23 000 litres per month); 
the second month it was down to 33 litres (1000 litres per month) and third month it jumped 
up again to 733 litres (22 000 litres per month). In the first and third months, the amount of 
water used was above the regulated daily minimum of 350 litres, while for the second month 
it 33 litres per day.  
 
I was careful not to raise expectations with the interviewees about being able to solve their 
problems but rather encouraged them to approach the Council for clarification where it was 
necessary. My ‘informant’ at Council offices confirmed that this respondent’s problem was 
indicative of a faulty meter that needed replacement. The officer quickilo litrey logged a 
query on the system and conceded that there were operational problems between the housing 
office and the depot responsible for attending to community complaints, especially after the 
installation of the WMDs.  
 
Although the depot has a staff shortage, there is a general unwillingness on their part 
to attend to these WMD complaints on time (Ms September, Wesfleur council official, 
personal interview 6 November 2011).  
 
She gave an example of a family that had lodged a complaint about a water cut-off, and had 
had no water for five days. The children refused to go to school because they had not had a 
bath and their uniforms were dirty. Although the complaint was logged, the depot officials 
took their time to fix the problem. 
 
I probed the official about the situation at the depot and she indicated that the problem was 
not only about staff shortages. There was a general feeling within the depot that they were not 
part of the project briefing process from the beginning but were now expected to pick up the 
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pieces and fix the problems created by consultants and unqualified plumbers. This kind of in-
house information would not have been available had it not for the good rapport that I had 
established with this official. This highlights the challenge of using consultants and the 
resultant passive resistance of internal staff who for various reasons, feel unhappy to carry the 
burden created by third parties. Even though the use of ‘restricted plumbers’ was designed to 
transfer basic plumbing skills, adequate checks and balances should have been put in place to 
ensure that such problems would not arise frequently. 
 
My key informant in the local office commented in passing that had similar issues happened 
in neighbouring Melkbosstrand,
28
 the response rate would be quicker because the residents 
paid rates and know how to exercise their rights, compared with the residents of Atlantis who 
rely on free water and are disempowered. While the Melkbosstrand comment was said in 
passing, the irony was not lost as it reflected the way different categories of residents are 
possibly discriminated against depending on their perceived social status.  
 
5.6 Other voices 
It was interesting to note that only one of the ten households targeted for an in-depth 
interview was aware of civic groups such as the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG) and 
their work to give a voice to the voiceless. Even the Ward Councillor acknowledged the 
tension between her personal opinion towards technologizing access to water by the poor, and 
the policies that the City, which she represents, implements. She indicated that although she 
was part of the decision-making process, she would not have the WMD installed on her 
property because she felt that it was intrusive and would violate her space and right to access 
water freely. In her opinion, if this technological intervention was right, then it should have 
been rolled out to all properties in Cape Town and surrounds without making it a preserve for 
the poor. She further argues that if the focus is to conserve water, the onus should not be 
placed squarely on the shoulders of the poor but should be borne by every water user in the 
City. ‘Water scarcity affects all sections of the population uniformly and should therefore be 
treated as such’, she added. It brings to the fore the issue mentioned earlier about former 
Mayor Helen Zille installing a WMD on her property. The major difference between that 
                                                        
28 Melkbosstrand (Afrikaans for Milkwood Beach) was a result of two significant Apartheid developments in the 
1970s – the Koeberg nuclear power station and Atlantis Diesel Engines. It provided good quality 
accommodation for foreign contractors. It is now dubbed the rich man’s town because it is home to both the 
local and the foreign rich and famous. It boasts a 7km stretch of white sandy beach. 
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publicity event and the reality in Saxonsea and other low-income areas is the choice to have 
the device, without being forced to accept it.  
5.7 Conclusion  
The chapter has looked at the various instruments and strategies put in place to negotiate 
access to water by poor urban households. Although the provision of FBW supply is supposed 
to provide relief to poor and struggling households, the focus by DWAF on restricting this 
access to water can be viewed as ironical. While these formally disadvantaged areas had 
inadequate access to water, they are now further burdened by technological controls in 
accessing the very water that is supposed to bring them relief. Previously, poor communities 
and households suffered under the yoke of discrimination; now, post-independence, the yoke 
of technological vigilantism burdens them. 
 
Section 27(1)(a) of the South African Constitution states that everyone has the right of access 
to water. It can be argued that the water management device gives an individual the right to 
access water. It is important to note that the right of access to water does not mean the right to 
water. South Africa’s waterscape is characterised by the complex relationship and power play 
between technologies, people and the ability to pay for services, on one hand, and political 
intervention, on the other. The waterscape has been reconfigured by the development and 
introduction of the FBW policy, which was championed by the Durban Municipality and 
designed to ensure that people had access to at least two hundred litres of water per day. 
Ironically, its implementation came with strings attached, as access to water had to be 
managed through a myriad of technological interfaces that would self-cut when the daily limit 
had been exhausted. Instead of the FBW policy providing the anticipated relief to the 
previously disadvantaged poor, it dealt them another blow: under apartheid, their access to 
water was limited and post-apartheid this access is regulated.  
 
While the technological interventions post positive results on the part of the City in terms of 
saving water and recovering costs, their impact on the households has varied. Even the lifeline 
tariff has become a space for further access regulation through technology. This discourse 
overrides how people have a say in the services they get. The fact that a prescribed set amount 
of water has been gazette as adequate for poor households based on their ability to pay poses 
challenges of discrimination, even though the indigent policy and the FBW policy are 
designed to improve access to water by the poor. 
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction  
Although water services in South Africa have seen a marked improvement from the apartheid 
era, there remains a need  for national government to keep up with meeting the needs of the 
poor while at the same time making strides to ensure economic growth. The current water 
service policy is situated within the neo-liberal framework, incorporated in GEAR, and seeks 
to achieve the triple objectives of equity, efficiency and sustainability.  
 
The study set out to explore the impact of installing and utilizing WMDs in Saxonsea; 
examine households’ participation in the installation of WMDs; and find out to what degree 
the rollout of WMDs could be seen as a tool that effectively enhances water management 
without sacrificing democratic objectives of improving access to resources by the previously 
disadvantaged poor. The key research findings were that although the introduction of the 
WMDs had resolved some residents’ concerns about unpaid water bills, the unintended 
consequence was the negative impact on quality of life and infringement of rights of access to 
water. Governance and technical issues emerged as the major challenges in the 
implementation of the intervention strategy. 
 
6.1.2 Governance and participation 
The study established that the conceptualization of WMDs was not done through citizens’ 
participation. Instead, residents became aware of the project at implementation stage and thus 
their participation and consultation were very limited. 
 
Poor communication and withholding vital information resulted in residents failing to make 
informed decisions about water access options. Participation in the project was not voluntary 
and some residents did not fully understand the advantages and disadvantages for the 
installation of WMDs. Although the municipality outsourced the technical changeover from 
conventional water metres to WMDs, it remained responsible for ensuring that proper 
procedures and communication protocols were adhered to fully. In addition, some 
respondents reported that they were told that it was compulsory for every household to have 
the devices, as failure to do so would result in dire consequences..   
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The use of consultants has, according to the results, presented post-project service challenges 
for households, and organizational challenges for the City in terms of depot staff engaging in 
low-level passive resistance by providing unsatisfactory service to households that experience 
problems with their devices and frequent water cuts. Results showed that, while the City 
provided FBW of 6kilo litre per household based on an average household size of eight 
people, this provision did not adequately cater for extended families or backyard dwellers; 
where in some cases there were 15 people. The ‘undocumented’ rent-paying backyard 
dwellers were not catered for separately, but shared the same daily allocation of 350 litres 
with their landlord. Because the installed WMDs had no display units to show the amount of 
water available for the day, some residents were frustrated when their daily allocation was 
exhausted early. It took them longer to figure out that they had to use their water sparingly to 
ensure that they had enough to last them the whole day.  Health implications, especially for 
households that cared for sick people, were dire with limited access to water. This reflects the 
impact of neo-liberal policy on water provision whose emphasis is on cost recovery, and 
negates its objectives of achieving equity in water service provision. 
 
6.1.3 Technical – implications for access to free basic water 
The high level of unemployment poses a complex problem for Atlantis households and the 
City. Although the impact of unemployment cuts across gender, race, age and other social 
factors, it is true that other factors such as skills and education level of individuals also play a 
significant role. The 2011 Census put the unemployment figures for Ward 29 to 26.58 % 
(City of Cape Town, 2011 Census Suburb Atlantis). This is a significant increase from 20.1% 
in the 2001 Census (Stats SA 2001). From the results of the survey, the education level is very 
low, with only 17% of respondents having completed matric and 0.9% having post matric 
qualifications. The rest either completed primary education (22%) and secondary education 
(56%), while 2% had no formal education at all. With these low levels of education, it is not 
surprising that there is high unemployment in the area. The employment pattern in an area is 
largely reflective of its economic growth. With the closure of factories and manufacturing 
plants in Atlantis, little economic activity resulted in a high unemployment rate; and with low 
education levels, the residents could not possibly compete with the greater Western Cape 
region for employment. Trapped in this cycle of inadequate employment, lack of income and 
low levels of education, it makes sense for the residents to accept the reality of free water that 
is not financially burdensome, even though it comes with access restrictions. Employment 
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would arguably provide individuals income to meet their basic requirements and improve 
their ability to pay for services. At the time of the study just over 60% of heads of households 
were unemployed and said they had no income to pay for basic services such as water. The 
respondents indicated that as much as they did not want to be in debt, their lack of income 
made it difficult for them to service their debt. Therefore, the installation of WMDs literally 
enabled them to manage their water consumption and debt level.  
 
The City had promised to write-off debt six months after installation of the WMDs, and the 
affected households readily accepted the offer as it meant they would not have to worry about 
accumulating debt. However, for some households, this promise did not materialise, and 
interviews with key informants, revealed that this was due to backilo litreogs within the 
system, but this information was never relayed to the affected residents. The fact that the 
respondents were worried about their debt and how they would service it without any 
meaningful income is different from someone saying they are entitled to free water. Some 
respondents commented that given adequate financial resources, they would want to service 
their debt as they were aware that services had to be paid for. The respondents said although 
they disliked the devices because of their restrictive access to water, the consolation was that 
they would not have to worry about payment because the water was free. 
 
 For the City, the installation of the WMDs was the first step towards cost recovery and 
conservation of water. The WMDs as debt control measures are used to restrict the lifeline 
water supply to those households that are unable to pay for the service. Their installation in 
low-income communities gives credibility to the criticism by various activists that these are 
discriminatory because water scarcity should be an issued addressed by all sectors of 
consumers and not just poor communities. The majority of respondents argued that if the City 
was not discriminatory in its approach to the project, greater efforts should have been made to 
ensure that the communities were made aware of the project and its benefits, as well as 
educating them on how to use the devices instead of the haphazard approach that was 
employed. Although the temporary employment of youths from the community to take part in 
the project was applauded, some respondents said these youths were not adequately trained 
and equipped to handle the project. The respondents complained that the use of ill-trained 
people was a reflection that the City did not care about the residents. Comparisons were made 
with the affluent communities, that the City would have made extra effort to use trained staff 
to service the rich because they have the financial resources to afford the services. 
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The integrated water repair programme that ran in conjunction with the installation of WMDs 
ensured that all leaks were repaired, and that resulted in massive saving of previously 
unaccounted water in households that had leaks on their properties. The WMDs have also 
assisted households identify leaks in the reticulation system as the presence of leaks adversely 
affects the consumption of the daily water allocation. Inadequate water allocation resulted in 
frustration for the majority of households as it took them a while to adjust to the daily limits 
of 350 litres. According to the City (2009), prior to the installation of the WMDs, the average 
monthly water consumption per household was 42 kilo litres, and this was reduced to 12 kilo 
litres..  
 
The City on its part argues that it has fulfilled the constitutional requirement by ensuring that 
residents have access to basic water services, and in addition, through the Indigent Grant, 
ensured that indigent residents have adequate access to basic services. However, the fact that 
the majority of residents (84%) were neither aware of the existence of the Indigent Grant, nor 
that they were beneficiaries of the grant, reveals gaps in communication between the council 
and the residents. Although this information is reflected in the utility bills, the majority of 
respondents said they did not know how to read and interpret the information. One respondent 
said, ‘All I look for when I open my bill is the amount owing, and the rest I do not understand 
what it means’ (Mr Dickson, questionnaire, 5 November 2011). 
 
6.2 Policy implications  
The emerging story from households is that their decisions to accept the installation of 
WMDs was purely economic, as indicated by one respondent: ‘As long as I do not have to 
pay for water, I will make a plan’ Mr Adam, questionnaire, 5 November 2011). Some 
respondents felt that the lack of consultation by the City prior to the installation of the devices 
was discriminatory and alluded that this was because of their economic status, given their 
inability to pay their bills. The majority of respondents, however, indicated that they were 
happy with the WMDs because it removed the burden of payment for water, and they could 
focus on putting food on the table instead. So on one hand they were grateful to have free 
water, but on the other hand they felt that decisions were being taken on their behalf and were 
not given a voice. The implementation of WMDs in poor households should not be used as an 
excuse for water conservation. If water conservation is the issue, then the focus must be on 
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ensuring that all users are aware of the issue and that appropriate measures are put in place, 
and that conservation is not the responsibility of low-income communities alone. Through the 
study, it would appear that water conservation is a preserve for poor households and it is 
‘forced’ (my emphasis) on them through WMDs.  
6.3 Conclusion 
The study has shown that the participation process was more symbolic than meaningful; more 
about mere consultation and communication than engaging in negotiated decision-making 
processes and planning to allow for effective monitoring by the residents as citizens. The use 
of devices to manage consumption of water by the poor infringes on their rights to water. 
During an informal discussion with one of the Wesfleur council officials, it emerged that the 
decision to withhold information was taken to avoid a situation where households  would be 
tempted to apply for additional water allocation they could not afford.. The official indicated 
that the City would rather have the residents comply with the free water allocation than create 
expectations of extra water, which would land them in the same situation of unpaid bills. 
 
The City as the ‘provider’ dictated the terms of engagement, as shown in the Table 5 (CSAs 
and plumbers door-to-door activities). By the time of the project’s implementation in 
Saxonsea, it was too late for any negotiated participation and input. Some respondents also 
said that citizen’s power was very low as illustrated by the top-down approach taken by the 
City in the project. Given the uptake of the project, the City could have gained mileage and 
trust through extensive awareness programmes using the local ward and community structures 
to emphasise the importance of the project and how it would empower households to manage 
their water consumption and, at the same time, reduce their debt burden. Even the promises 
for debt write-off should have been fulfilled during the given timeframe through effective 
planning within the local council office in Wesfleur, and in the event of delays, these too 
should have been communicated to the households to ensure that they were kept abreast of 
developments in the service delivery process. Now, the relationship that prevails is that of a 
skewed client-patron relationship with power balanced in favour of the water provider (the 
City). The tendency in this type of relationship is for the client (households) to become 
passive spectators in development projects supposedly designed for their benefit. The danger 
of this type of relationship is that people often find ways of expressing themselves through 
violent protests, which have gripped the country of late. The popular belief is that this is the 
most effective way of forcing all spheres of government to listen to their grievances.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
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If government is serious about addressing the issue of water scarcity and water conservation, 
then this should apply to every individual and not only a portion of the population as this 
amounts to denial of their constitutional rights. The Constitution does not say that poor 
households should have their access to water regulated through technological devices; it says 
every individual has the right of access to water.  
 
As an overall conclusion, evidence from the study indicates that households’ basic rights as 
enshrined in the Constitution and the UN and as argued elsewhere by Mehta (2000) have been 
infringed. The study therefore suggests that the use of WMDs should be carefully considered 
as their use purely focuses on cost recovery without considering the rights of poor people, 
whose rights were previously grossly undermined through apartheid’s skewed policies. 
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